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INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Northern Ireland has understandably been the
focus of considerable attention since the eruption of violence
in
1969.
Much has been made by journalists of religious influences
upon politics in the province.
On the other hand, academics have
tended to dismiss this analysis by describing religion as merely the
"shibboleth of the contending parties", or simply as "a manifestation
of the divisions in Ireland, land] not its cause."1
Thus, the religious
views of the different communities in Northern Ireland have not
received the large amount of attention that has been given to other
aspects of the confl ict.
While the struggle has been roundly
condemned In various ways as "a seventeenth-century religious
war," very few researchers have given proper consideration to both
the religious views of the different communities or to the way
religious organizations contribute to the intransigence of the conflict. 2
While I agree with assertions that religion is not the single most
important cause of the I rish "Troubles", I do believe that religion has
a competing claim to be one of the major factors contributing to the
intractabil ity of the situat ion.
There arc a number of reasons behind
th is.
The groups at conflict arc commonly distinguished as either
"Protestant" or "Catholic." This is not a journalistic invention; it is the
term preferred by the residents of the province when asked to
identify themselves I in a neutral setting, of course].3 Likewise, the
sociologists Cairns and Waddell have found that:
In Northern Ireland there are in a sense two competing
ethnopolitical identities, Irish and I3ritish, which are
underpinned, to a large extent, by the Catholic and Protestant religions respectively.4

By establishing the link between nationality and religion, they
have recognized how political icIentification can be dependent upon
faith in Northern Ireland.
While critics would be quick to point out
that religious identification in Ireland cIoes not always imply an
active faith, I would counter with the argument that, in a region
where approximately 70% of the population claims regular church
attendance, religious beliefs lllUSt contribute to the formulation of at
least some of the believer's political attitudes. 5
Brooke, in writing
about Ulster Presbyterianislll, points out the fact that the rejection of
religion as a political identification is a creation of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries; thus, one should be wary applying these
relatively recent values to a four century old conflict. 6
He says
almost indignantly that:
. . . religion is a crucial clement in the formation of
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'national identity . . . We still hear complaints that there
is a conflict in Northern Ireland between "Protestants"
and "Catholics" from those who would see nothing untoward
in conflicts between "French" and "Germans" . . . Being French
or German is as much a mailer of 'mere' opinion as being
Protestant or Catholic, and the history of religion is largely
the history of the process by which such 'mere opinions'
were formed. 7

Another reason that
feel that understanding the religious
views of the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland is important is
because religion has been a divisive issue in Irish politics not only in
the dim past but well into the twentieth century, and even to the
present day.
For example, by the early 1930s, when Northern
Ireland Parliament at Stormont had been established as a Unionist
domain, Prime Minister William Craig, later Lord Craigavon, spoke of
his motives and objectives:
I have always said that
am an Orangeman first and
a politician afterwards; all I boast is that we are a
Protestant Parliament for a Protestant sLate. R

In

reply, Irish revol u tionary leader Eamonn de Valera, who
headed the Irish Free State and the Irish Republic as either
Taioseach [Prime Minister\ or President for 50 years, replied more
formally yet no less definitively that "Ireland remains a Catholic
nation. "9
This adherence to the dominant religion in each part of the
island is hardly empty rhetoric. The BllJlreac!zt n([ !zEireann, or the
Irish Constitution of 1937, states that the Irish Roman Catholic
church, though not the state church, would enjoy special status as the
church of the bulk of the population of the twenty-six counties.! 0
The idea of religion being a crucial part of one's political allegiance
has been used by some of Ireland's foremost politicians; it also is
viewed in this way by many of the less exalted residents of the
province.
For example, an anecdote was told to me by the Member
of Parliament (MP) for South Belfast, the Reverend Martin Smyth. It
also illustrates how religion is viewed by at least some of those in the
thick of the conflict in Northern Ireland:
I was in the streeL with this crowd of rioters-this was in
the '69 riots-trying to pacify them.
The drink was beginning to wear off, and they were beginning to recognize
me as well. This fellow said, "I've no time for your Jesus!"
I said to him,"Why, what are you'?"
lie says,"I'm an agnostic."
I looked at the other ones and I said,"Did you hear
that fellows'? What this boy says? lIe's an agnostic!"
IThey askedl"What's that, Mr. Smyth?"
I said,"Well, an agnostic is a person who doesn't
know what he believes,"
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The fellow realized he'd put his foot in, and he said,
"But I'm a Protestant agnostic!"
I said, "An agnostic is one who doesn't know what he
believes."
The fellows who were slaring al him said, "What are
you doing here? This is a religiolls war!"
The fellow cleared off real quickly then . . . I I

While the violence in Northern Ireland is not caused by a dispute
over such religious concepts as infant baptism or the truth of the
virgin birth, there is at least a prima facie case for studying the way
religion influences political behavior in the six Ulster counties.
The primary focus of this study will be upon the Protestants of
Northern Ireland, and
s p e c i f i c ~t11 y upon
the den 0 in ina t ion a I
differences within this community. Of the studies that focus
primarily upon Ulster Protestants, many have discerned a trait that
Dr. A.T.Q. Stewart among others has called a "siege mentality."12 For
convenience as well as for clari ty, I shall use the synonymous term
garrisonism". The use of this term conjures up several images that I
believe accurately describe Unionist political behavior.
Later I w111
discuss more fully the sources of this siege mentality; here I shall
content myself with a brief description of its characteristics.
One of
these images is of a defensive group of people who are assailed from
a number of directions.
Being on the defensive inherently implies
feelings of insecurity; in this case, it is primarily an insecurity about
the future of the province's link with Britain.
"Garrisonism" also
implies that there is a sense of being an outpost in a foreign land.
Along these lines, the Ulster Protestants feel themselves to be an
outpost of British culture on the overwhelmingly Gaelic, Roman
Catholic island of Ireland. 13
These differences have prompted one
Ulster Unionist to write:
The (Irish Republic's) claim (to Northern Ireland) is
billerly resented by the Unionists because Unionists
sec the Irish Republic as differing fundamentally in
ethos from the United Kingdom, and this ethos Unionists
do not share.' 4

The fact that Northern Ireland is a separate state from the Republic
of Ireland means that part of this difference in "ethos," like a
garrison, is that there is also a clearly defined territory to be
defended as "British" from those who would make it "Irish".
Of
course, geographically speaking, there is no hasis for the entire island
not to be called Irish; the political horder, however, is of interest in
this case.
Being part of a garrison also implies that there are clear choices
when deciding whether to be part of the British or the Irish cultures,
as if it were a matter of opening a gate and crossing over to the other
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side. For a considerable number of Ulster Protestants, the issues do
seem clear-cut: "Ulster is British," as countless wall slogans attest,
and there will be "No Surrender" to the Irish. Those who share these
feelings either in spirit or out of acquiescence are wise to keep less
stringent views to themselves, for political figures who have spoken
out against these concepts even modestly (such as Terence O'Neill or
Brian Faulkner) were branded "Lundies," or traitors, who would have
opened the gates to the other side-in this case, the Catholic
community.
Indeed, the Ulster-Irish colloquialism "Lundy"
illustrates this point.
In 1688, the Lord Mayor of Londonderry,
Robert Lundy, sought to surrender to the advancing armies of
Catholic King James II rather than endure a siege of the city. Fearing
tales of Catholic atrocities, a group or young apprentices closed the
gates. This act is celebrated every year by a Protestant organization
called the Apprentice Boys, who also burn the "traitorous" Lundy in
effigy in front of large crowds of Ulster Protestants. The literality of
the term garrisonism can be seen in the closing of the gates, and I
contend that the annual reenactment is a symbolic recommitment to
close the gates against future threats.! 5
There are a number of sources of this garrisonism of the Ulster
Protestant communi ty.
One area of gaffi son i sm concern sits
relationship with mainland Britain.
The difficulties Northern Ireland
has caused successive British governments are no secret, and neither
are the strong feelings amongst some in Britain who would prefer to
be rid of the province. For example, when the Ulster Unionist Party
sponsored a candidate in the 1985 London-Fulham by-election, he
received less than 100 votes.
This prompted one researcher to
comment that:
While reliant upon
testants know well
vailing costs, at the
people do not want

Rritish support, Ulster Proenough that, given the preend or the day the British
them.! 6.,

Some reasons for this lack of sympathy should be fairly
obvious. Northern Ireland costs Britain approximately .£. 5.4 million
per day, so it seems to many a financial drain on the British
economy.!7 Killings and bombings on the British mainland make the
conflict uncomfortably real to many residents.
In direct contrast to
the reality of violence is the obscurity of the motives behind it, for
the political cleavages in Britain are oriented differently from those
inN orthern I rei and. For example, the Conservati ve and Labour
Parties that contest general elections in England, Scotland, and Wales
are virtually non-existent in the north of Ireland.
Deeper than this
superficial pol itical di vergence Iies a more fundamental dichotomy of
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concepts. David Miller, a historian, describes the political aspects of
Protestant garrisonism towards Britain:
The dilemma of the Ulster Protestant community derived
from their conception of both their political obligation
and their rights of citizenship in contractual terms.
Lacking a genuine feeling of co-nationality with the
British people, they could not entrust their fate to "safeguards" which depended upon the willingness of that
people to intervene in Irish affairs to rectify abuses.
Just as the guarantee of Ulster Protestant allegiance
was their own fidelity to the contract of government,
so the guarantee of their rights . . . was the reciprocal
faithfulness of the sovereign authority.
But the sovereign authority was effectively no longer a single
person, the monarch, but a parliament responsible to
the people.
The people are fickle, and it is a fundamental
feature of the British constitution that Parliament is
incapable of giving binding promises; any law enacted
by one Parliament can be repealed by the next.
That
constitutional system simply lacks a concept of entrenched
rights heyond the reach of the clirrent Commons majority.! 8

Thus, a concrete constitutional reason lies beneath the feelings
of insecurity held by many Ulster Protestants concerning their
relationship with Britain.
The way the Protestants cling so fervently
to the link with Britain is, again, similar to that of an outpost that
fears being abandoned by the mother country to fend for itself.
Evidence for this also comes from the conspicuous absence of a
strong
Ulster independence
movement.!9
Though the Ulster
Protestants have a strong regional identity that allows them to feel
fundamentall y different from the den izen s of ei ther Engl and,
Scotland, or Wales, and even though there is evidence that they feel
less in common with their geographically closer neighbors to the
south than with their co-nationals in Britain, the Protestants have
been reluctant to call for indepencience. 2o Of the varied reasons for
this, the economic situation of the province along with the small size
of Northern Ireland seem to be the strongest motivations for this
failure to actively seek autonomy.
Other sources of garrisonism lie in the past.
As many have
noted, references to history tend to crop up with amazing frequency
in Irish political affairs.
A.T.O. Stewart writes that "Ireland, like
Dracula's Transylvania, is much troubled by the undead."2! In a
more serious vein, he develops the idea of the past asserting itself
into today's affairs in Ireland.
In doing so, he speaks of how past
experiences of the Protestant community has produced these feelings
of garflsomsm:
The planters were frontiersmen, and
played frontier attitlldes where their

naturally dislands bordered
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on those of the native septs . . . (They) developed over
a long time a special kind of siege mentality created
by the necessity of having always to test the loyalty
of those within the settlement itself, both the "Irish"
settled in pockets within the frontier and those whose
steadfastness might have been undermined by constant
day to day contact with them, as a countercheck to inevitable
hibernicization. . .From the outset they faced the menace
of a fifth column. This was and still is the essence of what
is called the Ulster problem. 22

Thus
Stewart describes two focal points of Protestant garrisonism,
namely fear of the "native" Irish population (meaning here the
Roman Catholic citizens of both the Irish Republic and of Northern
Ireland), and fear of those within the Protestant ranks who would
compromise with these "natives"-the "fifth column" of Lundies.
Strictly speaking, it is improper to speak of the differences between
the Protestants and Catholics In Ireland as a problem between
"settler" and "nati ve."
The PI antat ion of Ulster, a large-scale
"homestead" plan which granted large tracts of Irish lands to
Protestant settlers from Britain, occurred in 1007, and immigration
from Scotland had undoubtedly gone on for centuries before that.
However, the Plantation was distinct from previous types of
settlement because it did not result In a mixing of the British and
Irish.
Though previous immigrants to the isle had been accused of
being "More Irish than the Irish", the Plantation of Ulster caused
bitterness between the settlers and the natives that led to the
garrisonism of today.
For example, Long noted this continuing
separation of the two communities:
While there has been considerable intermarriage
over the centuries. . .there has been no integration
of the Protestant and Catholic communities) 3

Thus, divisions between the two groups have remained to the
present era.
Bearing this in mind, it is possible to find, as Stewart
did, correlations between settlers looking for signs of compromising
behavior in their neighbors which might lead to dire consequences
and present-day voters who fear a modern compromIse having
similar adverse results.
My primary focus is upon the garrisonism that is directed
within the Ulster Protestant community itself.
Tension seems to
arise primarily between the Presbyterian churches and the Church of
Ireland, and of course, these frictions come from a number of
reasons. In a nutshell, though, I believe the essence of their quarrel
is that reI i giously fund amen tal i st, work i ng -cl ass to lower-middle
class Presbyterians fear "Lundies" coming from within the ranks of
the religiously liberal, financially better-off Church of Ireland.
This
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concept has been propounded by both the historian Stewart and the
sociologist Nelson, and may also be inferred from information
collected by Moxon-Browne. 24
As it appears, this is an extremely broad generalization that
requires further explanation.
first I want to assert that these
differences are subordinate to the other two areas of garrisonism
that are directed outside the Protestant community towards Irish
Catholics and mainland Britons. The overwhelming majority of Ulster
Protestants,
regardless
of their
denomination,
support
the
continuance of the link with Britain. As has been noted by numerous
observers, the Ulster Protestant community tends to close ranks
when presented with a crisis that threatens this link.
HClwever, I
believe that this characteristic has been over-emphasized.
The
Unionist community has too often been portrayed as a monolithic
group of people with identical goal s and bel iefs which results in an
almost telepathic consensus about political questions.
This view is
far too simplistic.
As I have stated, the Ulster Unionist community
has internal frictions that exacerbate existing fears about their
present pol itical sit uation.
The same logic beh ind the American
phrase "United we stand, but divided we fall" has prevailed in times
of crisis for the Ulster Unionists. Despite the fact that these internal
insecurities are secondary, they exist within the Ulster Protestant
community and have implications for Protestant political behavior.
By high- lighting these differences, I hope to draw attention to an
aspect of Protestant politics that previously has not received proper
academic attention. However, I am definitely not implying that it is
the most important political cleavage in Northern Ireland.
Also, it should be fairly predictable that Irish Presbyterians are
not exclusively working and lower middle-class, nor are the
members of the Church of Ireland all middle and upper-class.
However, the Presbyterian church~.s .. do have proportionately more
working-class than the Church of Ireland, and likewise the Church of
Ireland has proportionately more upper-class believers than the
Presbyterians. These characteristics have noticeable political
ramificat ions-Pres byteri an s tend to gra v i tate toward s the more
openly intransigent, anti-establishment Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) while members of the Church of Ireland tend to belong to the
less extreme Official Unionist Party (OUP), or to the only political
party in Northern Ireland without a preponderance of members from
one religiolls community, the Alliance Party.25
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Reported Political Allegiances €If @U'3teua:na
% of
% of
%of
Alliance
OUP
DUP
Religious Denomination
23.3
44.7
21.6
Church of Ireland
22.8
34.5
44.8
Presbyterians
1.1
0.0
9.5
Pree Presbyterians
5.2
l.8
6.0
Methodists
0.5
0.8
5.2
Baptists
44.0
0.0
0.0
Roman Catholic
4.1
15.3
12. I
Others *

% of
pop.

19
23

2
4
28
26

*includes those who declined to state a religious preference

As these loyalties may be partially explained in economic
terms, they also seem to be a political manifestation of the religious
differences between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. In
the course of this project, I plan to demonstrate how the
fundamentalist, uncomprOmISIng theology of the Presbyterian
churches makes rigid and uncompromising political behavior more
acceptable to many Ulster Protestants, and, indeed, the above
statistics seem to hear this out.
Conversely, the more theologically
liberal views of the Church of Ireland about religious differences
translates into more liheral attitudes towards compromise on
political differences.
Thus, those who oppose religious and political
compromise are distrustful of those who are more inclined to bendand thus is born the fear of "Lundies".
Finally, I should explain why I have chosen to not examIne
other Protestant denominations in the province such as the
Methodists or the Baptists.
Numerically, these groups are tiny
fractions of the Protestant population of the province, and thus
statistically are not the major blocks of the Northern Irish electorate
that are formed by the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland.
Strength of Protestant Denom·in-ations in N. Ireland 26
Church of Ireland
35.6%
Preshyterian
46.5%
Free Preshyterian
1.6%
Methodists
8.0%
I.W)()
Baptists
Others
6.4%
While not discounting the attitudes of these groups, it seems more
fruitful to explore the differences between the main Protestant
denominations.
What are the results of this Ulster Protestant garrisonism? One
obvious ramification IS that it stands directly In the way of
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consensual progress towards a peaceful resol ution of the massive
problems that engulf Northern Ireland.
Of course, there are a mindboggling number of factors that seem to interact almost in Brownian
motion that also stand in the way of "resolving" the situation. Thus,
Ulster Protestant garrisonism is both a cause of these factors and an
effect of them.
For example, by clinging so reflexively to the link
with Britain, the Unionists are effectively standing in the way of any
progress towards a solution to the conflict. Conversely, they cling to
the union so tightly precisely because virtually all of the proposed
solutions seem to involve its ultimate abolition.
Thus, the specter of Irish annexation combined with the everpresent possibility of British infidelity makes a solid, united Unionist
front an imperative for the continued existence of Northern Ireland.
However, more extreme loyalists, contained primarily within the
ranks of the Presbyterian churches, tend to question the resolve of
those more inclined to compromise, who seem most likely to appear
in the Church of Ireland.
This distrust leads to greater insecurity
within Unionist ranks and thus to increased garrisonism, for not only
must the more vehement Unionists be wary of the maneuverings of
the Irish Republic and the intentions of the British mainland, but
they also must watch for those Lundies within their own ranks who
would leave the gates open to compromise over Northern Ireland's
ultimate constitutional status.
This means that virtually any
compromise or attempt to establish working dialogues between the
two communities is fiercely resisted by a considerable portion of the
Protestant community and viewed as the proverbial "foot In the
door." This resistance would assuredly include members from all the
main Protestant denominations, but I would contend that it would
have a higher proportion from the Presbyterian community than
those from the Church of Ireland.
Developing this concept will be a
major part of this paper, but it is. !1()t the sole purpose. I also feel
that a concise history of Ulster Unionism, along with a brief
examination of the relevant characteristics of the parties that attract
more than negligible support in the Unionist community (Le., the
DUP, the OUP, and the Alliance Party) will be helpful.
Also, the
interesting case of the Reverend Ian Paisley (a Free Presbyterian
minister) provides an example of a paragon of Ulster garrisonism
who is additionally the most popular political figure in the province.
An examination of how his theology influences his political beliefs is
helpful as a case study of a figure that embodies the fear of
Catholicism, the distrust of Britain, and the ever-present search for
Lundies that pervades so much of Ulster Unionism. Also, a study of
the ecumenical movement In Northern Ireland, along with its
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conspicuous sluggishness, helps show the dividing Jines within the
Protestant community between Anglican and Presbyterian.
In concl usion, I want to point out that many of these theories
have been developed from personal examination of the province, and
thus I have been forced to assemble from diverse sources the
documentation for this theory, sometimes at great distances.
To my
knowledge, the book about this aspect of Northern Irish Protestant
political behavior has yet to be written.
Thus, there will be areas
that are less-fully documented than I would prefer, and there will be
times that the conclusions drawn seem controversial. I again want to
emphasize that my purpose in preparing this project is to shed light
on a relatively unexplored area of Irish politics, and my :lim is to
bring interesting facts and possible conclusions to the attention of
those who might otherwise overlook them.
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HISTOI{Y OF lJLSTER lJNIONISM
In the previous chapter, some basic observations about the
political behavior of the Ulster Protestants were made and a few
conclusions drawn.
One is that the Protestants of Northern Ireland
behave politically in a manner I feel is best described by the term
"garrisonism".
That is, they are extremely defensive about their
constitutional status as a part of the United Kingdom.
A second is
that within this Protestant community, there are internal frictions
that occur primarily along denominational lines, although economic
and social differences accompany these religious demarcations
between the major denominations of the Church of Ireland and the
Presbyterian churches.
Third, these frictions inside the Protestant
community, though often overshadowed by externally directed
conflicts (such as those with the Roman Catholic community),
heighten the sense of garrisonism amongst many in the Protestant
community by destabilizing the oft-observed "solidity" of the Ulster
Protestants in defending the link with Britain.
In order to better
understand the first observation concerning the garrisonistic
behavior of Ulster Protestants both today and in the past, it is
necessary to examine the history of Ulster unionism.
In the process,
basic knowledge about the Unionist community may be gained that is
crucial to later assessment of the validity of the second and third
observation s.
The present deployment of Unionist political forces can be
traced back to a little over one hundred years ago with the rise of
the Irish Home Rule movement.
The Liberal Prime Minister William
Gladstone made Irish causes a cornerstone of his 1885 manifesto,
and giving the Irish their own parliament \Vas a fundamental goal.
While warmly welcomed
by much of the Irish population, the
prospect of Home Rule aroused dark fears in many Irish Protestants.
Since the overwhelming majority of Ireland's Protestants lived in the
nine Ulster counties,l the hotbed of opposition to the home rule
movement lay in the northern province.
In 1885, Ulster citizens
concerned about the prospect of home rule hastily organized to
muster their opposition to Home Rule. Because the crisis had caught
many Protestants off-guard, no formal machinery existed to facilitate
political activity.
As a result, the framework of the Orange Order, a
fraternal lodge dedicated to the agressive and provocative assertion
of Protestantism, was used as an organizational basis. 2
The Order
was also a major vehicle for the formation of the Ulster Unionist
Council(UUC), in 1886. These two facts help show that Unionism was
from the heginning almost exclusively a Protestant movement.
Like
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the Order, Ulster Unionism had a distinct democratic flavor that was
notable for a time well before universal suffrage had appeared in the
United Kingdom.
Chronicler of the Ulster Unionist Party John
Harbinson has written that:
. . . the Ulster Unionist Council developed as an
umbrella under which Unionists of all classes
and depth of conviction took shelter from the
chill wind of anti-partitionisl11. . .the fundamental exercise of maintaining Protestant
power, and hence the union, was best achieved
by this loose federal structure)

He has also drawn attention to one of the major factors motivating
Protestants to oppose dismantling of the constitutional link with
Britain--they saw it as detrimental to their political and economic
interests.
Particularly at the end of the nineteenth century, Irish
Protestants were on the top of the island's socio-economic ladder. 4
Because they benefitted from the union in a number of ways, they
sought to maintain it.
It should not be construed that all Protestants
were wealthy or even well off. Still, being a Protestant in Ireland at
this time meant for many the benefits of being in a special category.
Historian David Miller has written that in nineteenth-century
Ireland:
Social change might put one's class in jeopardy
but one could never lose the status which
attached to being a Protestant, except by some
unthinkable act, such as marrying a Catholic.
In many situation his essence was still his
social position,i.e., his Protestantism. s

Thus, it seems that what loss of the Union meant socially and
economically to the bulk of the Irish population in 1885 was that
Protestant privileged status would be suppressed by the 90% Roman
Catholic population of the island.
While this was unsurprisingly
welcomed by Irish Catholics, it was also resisted by Ulster
Protestants. Religious fears also phl'yed a significant role in this early
Protestant opposition to Home Rule.
The rhetorical phrase that
enjoyed considerable popular currency in both islands at the time
was that "Home Rule means Rome Rule," referring not only to the
strong ultramontanist characteristics of the Irish Roman Catholic
Church hierarchy, but also to the high level of political control at
even the parish level. 6
This, combined with the strongly antiProtestant stance of the Vatican at the turn of the century, led many
Ulster Protestants to the conclusion that they might not only lose
their socio-pol i tical hegemony, but might even lose their "right" to be
Protestant. 7
It was assumed that the elimination of divorce and
other restrictions would be incorporated into any government that
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depended solely upon support from the Catholic population of the
island, and this would suppress Protestant freedoms, perhaps even
those of the freedom to worship.
As one woman reminisced about
the Home Rule issue, she described a song that her father had taught
her:
Sir Edward Carson had a cat
that sat upon a fender,
And every time it caught a mouse
it shouted 'No Surrender!,g

She went on to state that, "There was never any doubt in my mind
that the surrender dreaded was to the powers of Rome." 9 While this
Protestant/Catholic dichotomy is often cited, less noted has been the
historical animosity between the Anglican Church of Ireland and the
more fundamentalist Presbyterians.
When presented the possibility
of both Protestant faiths heing miniscule minorities in a Catholic
Ireland, however, old wounds healed rather quickly.
As Brooke, a
historian of Ulster Presbyterianism has written:
The Unionist Party was, of course, a mass-based party
which fulfiIIed at least one of the historical purposes
of the British political parties~to override religious
differences(in this case, as principally in the British
parties, the differences among Protestants) in favour
of a great national secular cause. lO

The secular cause was, of course, to defeat Home Rule.
Though
united in times of crisis, the Anglican/Presbyterian split did not
disappear; it was only made less apparent in light of a greater crisis.
In these early days of Unionism can be found the same reasons
given today hy Ulster Unionists for their rigid, unyielding
commitment to the Act of Union.
rear of a loss of their favoured
socio-economic status combined with religious opposition to Roman
Catholicism made the majority of Ulster Protestants side with the
Conservative and Liheral Unionists in Britain to defeat the first Home
Rule Bill in 1886.
The Second I-lome Rule Bill of 1893 seems in retrospect to have
been doomed to failure.
The same coalition of parliamentarians that
had combined to defeat the bill seven years before regrouped and
were again victorious despite the fact that the Ulster Unionist Council
had further strengthened its organizational framework. Some
researchers have discerned a decided regional autonomy developing
about this time in the relations of the Ulster Unionists with their
fellow Unionists to the south. ll
Though the thought of home rule for
only part of Ireland (i.e., partition) was far from a topic of open
discussion in orthodox Unionist circles at this time, one can see the
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beginnings of a subtle shift of the focus of Ulster Unionist
deliberations to their own backyards.
After the turn of the century, a string of Liberal successes
under the stewardship of Herbert Henry Asquith brought Irish Home
Rule back into the political limelight.
As Home Rule began to seem
more and more of an inevitability, Ulster Unionists began to talk of a
separate dispensation from the rest of Ireland.
Here is where
partition was born.
Possibilities of nine-county, six-county, and even
four-county exclusion (Londonderry, Antrim, Down, and Armagh)
were
bandied about for some time.
Though the Unionist leader,
Dubliner Sir Edward Carson, was opposed to any partition, the Ulster
Unionists began to seriously search for any possible way to opt out of
Home Rule. Partition seemed the only means of doing this, and sixcounty partition in particular seemed the best way to insure Unionist
hegemony in the years to come, for the high percentage of Roman
Catholics in the three western Ulster counties of Donegal, Cavan, and
Monaghan would make Protestant electoral majorities much less
certain. 12
After the Parliament Act of 1911 significantly reduced the
powers of the overwhelmingly Conservative and Unionist House of
Lords by removing their powers of veto, nothing seemed to stand in
the way of the combined forces of the Liberal Party and the Irish
"Home Rulers," often inaccurately dubbed the Irish Parliamentary
Party, of bringing home rule to the island of Ireland. 13 Committed to
their opposition of Home Rule, the Ulster Unionist Council made use
of an obscure constitutional clause to form the Ulster Volunteer
Force(UVF).
Not to be confused with today's urban paramilitary
group of the same ti tIe, the UVF of 1912 was a province-wide
organization that was committed to "defending the constitution of the
United Kingdom as it now stands".14 Though in the early days they
trained with wooden guns to th.~. mirth of many Home Rulers,
matters took a serious turn when the Larne gun-runnings of early
1914 brought thousands of German rifles to the UVF. In that year,
the delaying powers of the House of Lords expired, and the
enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill seemed certain.
Thus, in the
name of King and Country, Ulster Unionists ironically stood ready to
rebel.
It is perhaps prudent to examine this paradoxical stand by the
Ulster Unionists, for it is typical of attitudes today that lead
observers to dub them the "voice of illogicality" .15
While claiming to
be "Loyalists," the Ulster Protestants, either through acquiescence or
active support, were behaving in a positively mutinous manner.
Thus it seems that Unionists were in the perplexing situation of being
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ready to rebel in order to remain loyal to Britain. At the heart of this
confusing situation is what Miller has identified as a contractarian
view of politics. lIe points out that:
Loyalty is quite different from nationality . . .The
Ulster Protestants are Irishmen, Ulstermen, and
British at the same time. By remaining loyal to
the crown (and not necessari Iy the Crown in
Parliament) they are being honest, faithful to
a contract entered into hundreds of years ago. l6

The contract he refers to is the agreement of the late seventeenth
century between King William III (of England) and the Protestants of
the realm that they would remain loyal as long as the monarch was a
Protestant.
Miller points out a crucial factor: Ulster Protestants are
loyal not to the prevailing elected Government at Westminster but to
the constitutional source of all authority in British politics, namely
the reigning monarch.
This leads to serious misunderstandings,
particularly when, as in 1912, Unionists and the Government in
Westminster are at loggerheads as to which course to take.
For
example, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees
bitterly complained of the Unionists that, "Loyalty to the UK was
supposed to be their creed but only as long as it suited them."17
Perhaps a more understanding view was voiced by Nelson:
If (Protestants) acknowledged loyalty it was as
something reciprocal.
To propose [mutiny] . . .
was not disloyal if Britain had already shown
disloyalty to Ulster Protestants.! H

Thus, it must be remembered that there is a complicated logic behind
such an apparent paradox as Ulster Unionists rebelling to remaIn
loyal.
At about the time it seemed certain that the Ulster Unionists
were preparing to fight the Irish Nationalists who were also arming,
the First World War provided a foreign outlet for tensions in the
British Isles. While it possibly helped defuse a civil war in Britain
itself, political violence became a reality in Ireland with the 1916
Easter Rising in Dublin.
Though the surviving participants of the
rising were spit upon by the populace of Dublin as they were led
through the streets, the harsh British reaction that culminated in the
execution of such men as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly turned
renegades into martyrs.
The simmering trouble in Ireland erupted
with a vengeance in the fall of 1918.
Sinn Fein, which won every
seat outside Ulster with the exception or the four Trinity CollegeDublin seats, established the DaiL Eirc([llll, or Irish Parliament, in
Dublin after the December elections.
The heavy-handed attempts of
the British government to restore order led to even fiercer resistance
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in the three southern provinces of Connacht, Munster, and Leinster.
Faced by such an unstable situation, the Coalition Government under
Lloyd-George passed the Government of Ireland Act (1920) that
called for the establishment of two separate parliaments in Belfast
and Dublin that were still tied to the United Kingdom.
The
Republican forces did not accept the compromise attempt.
The
violence in Ireland continued, and
public outcry in Britain forced
Lloyd-George to negotiate a treaty that left virtually no one
satisfied .19
As civil war flared up in the new twenty-six county
Irish Free State about whether to accept partItIOn of Ireland,
sectarian violence spread throughout Northern Ireland.
The
Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont (a district in south Belfast)
was established along the lines called for in the Government of
Ireland Act (1920). Thus, the "Protestant parliament for a Protestant
people" (though Northern Ireland was at this time almost one-third
Roman Catholic) was established in an atmosphere of sectarian
violence and civil war.
These extreme conditions were to manifest
themselves in the political
hehavior of Stormont Unionist
parliamentarians for the next fifty years.
The new Northern Irish Parliament was not independent; it
was an experiment in "devolved government," with ultimate power
residing in Westminster, particularly in such areas as revenue
disbursement.
In practice, however, the House of Commons paid
little attention to the operation of the Stormont parliament, and
allowed the Ulster Unionists virtual autonomy.
Nelson has discerned
a numher of traits that marked the years of Unionist dominance
(1921-1972): one, that democracy to many in the Northern Irish
state meant majority rule was absolute; two, constitutional issues
(i.e., whether Northern Ireland would continue to exist as part of the
UK or not) were crucial, and all other matters (such as socio-economic
reform) were secondary; three, as a _.:result of this, politics came to be
viewed as a zero-sum game where someone's gain implied someone
else's loss; four, the predictability of political outcomes in the
province meant that there were shared expectations/frustrations on
both sides; and five, that refusal to compromise quickly became "a
sign of integrity. "20
What this meant for politics in the province was that the
"Unionists were the winners in 1920, they made the rules after that,
and did their best to enforce them."21 The Unionists were guilty of
gerrymandering, perhaps most notoriously in the case of the city of
Derry/Londondcrry,22 and even the official chronicler of the UUC has
admitted that some Party Secretaries "knew every trick that was in
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the book, and some that were not" 10 order to assure Unionist
electoral victories. 23
It should be pointed out that as the immediacy of the Home
Rule "threat" receded and became a memory, the Unionist Party, as it
was now beginning to be called, began to show signs of
fragmentation.
Such a diverse coalition as the UUP had to have
considerable political inertia to remain cohesive in calmer times, and
from time to time there were challenges. Typical of these challenges
was the Independent Unionist Party.
Nelson has captured the
paradoxical significance of the Independent Unionists:
The Independent Unionist tradition is more significant than internal party divisions (in the Ulster
Unionist Party 1920-19(9) . . . It is not really socialist because its adherents have not shared conventional socialist assumptions about class structure
and class connie!. . .Nevertheless the Independent
Unionist tradition sustained, and gave a focus for,
Protestant working-class hostility to traditional
(middle-class) leaders and policies--especially in
certain areas of Belfast, like the Shankill."24

While tangential to Ulster Unionism as a whole, the Independent
Unionist tradition, along with other splinter Unionist groups such as
the Progressive Unionists, betray the complex nature of Unionist
politics-while undoubtedly united in support of the link with Britain,
Ulster Unionism should not be considered single-minded to the
exclusion of all else.
Though geographically isolated, Northern
Ireland does not live in isolation, and many of the same issues that
cropped up in European politics caused tension at Stormont not just
along the tradi tional cleavages of U nioni st/N ationalist but wi thin the
major parties themselves.
However, the continued dominance of the
Ulster Unionist Party throughout these years testifies to the accuracy
of Nelson's recognition of the primacy of constitutional issues in the
politics of Northern Ireland from the_ 1920s until the 1960s, and for
the majority of voters in Northern Ireland, up to the present-day.
From the 1930s to the 1950s, these frictions were held in check
through a near-autocratic party leadership that was also in direct
contact with the sectarian attitudes of the grassroots of the party.
Tensions quickly came to a head in the 1960s when the leadership
began to attempt mild reforms.
In 1963, Captain Terence O'Neill
became leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and thus Prime Minister
of Northern Ireland. I1is goal was to gradually change Northern Irish
political life to more closely resemble that of the British mainland. 25
He began to appear openly with stich ohviotlsly Roman Catholic
figures as nuns and priests, which, \vhile hardly considered improper
by the majority of Unionists, did raise some eyebrows. O'Neill caused
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himself further trouble when he invited Irish Taioseach Sean Lemass
to visit, thus breaking an unwritten rule of the Ulster Unionists that
at least subtle hostility must be shown towards the Republic at all
times to avoid any misconceptions about the weakening of Ulster
Unionist resolve.
It was at this time that Ian Paisley, ever on the
extreme fringe of Protestant politics, hegan his famous chant of
"O'Neill must go!" While at this time still in the decided minority, the
numbers repeating this incantation began to grow because of a
movement that was expanding independently of the traditional
groups of Northern Irish political life.
As in most of the western world, the 1960s brought unrest to
Ulster. The foundations of it hegan innocuously enough in the form
of a group inspired by the successes of Martin Luther King that
sought to give greater civil rights to the Roman Catholic population of
the province.
The Civil Rights Movement sought to redress some of
the glaring sectarianism of the Northern Irish police force, most
notably in their demands for the disbandment of the "B Specials", a
large group of Protestant pol ice reservists, as well as espousing such
social goals as equality in public housing for Catholics and
Protestants.
It was from the beginning a predominantly Roman
Catholic movement, and when they began to march through the
streets demanding equal treatment, the old, predictable parameters
of Stormont politics that Nelson described hegan to crumble.
Here
was a rapidly growing group for whom the old constitutional issues
were not paramount. They were denyi ng the right of the majority to
rule as it saw fit; indeed, they were forwarding the claim that had
received only sporadic support in the 1920-1960 period that the
majority not only ought to seek equality, but had a moral imperative
to do so.
In short, the Civil Rights Movement was a challenge to
many of the postulates of Protestant politics of the previous forty
years.26
This challenge from outside the Unionist community was thus
paralleled by new uncertainties within the Unionist leadership.
Even
the modest reforms and gestures of Terence O'Neill were too much
for increasing numbers of Protestants.
With every march, more
Protestants began to feel threatened and the siege mentality
reasserted itself. The numbers of Protestants clamoring for O'Neill's
removal grew. In the fall of 1968, a civil rights march was stoned at
Burntollet Bridge hy a Protestant mob under the eyes of the
overwhelmingly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The old
lines began to he drawn yet again, and soon there was no room for
compromise in the Unionist ranks.
In the spring of 1969, a rash of
bomhings at power stations
across the province provoked demands
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for order that O'Neill could not provide.
lIe resigned in the fall of
1969, and shortly after his resignation, it became clear that it was
the Protestant paramilitary group, the UYF, which had been
nominally reformed In 1966, which was responsible for the
bombings, and not the IRAJ7
The reasons one portion of the
Unionist community would use such methods to depose a leader are
fundamentally the same as those which led to the formation of the
old UVF In 1912: loyalty is conditional, and if one contractor breaks
the faith, as many felt O'Neill had done, it was indeed time for him to
go, and, to some at least, any means of effecting this removal was
justified.
A succession of Unionist leaders followed, and none were able
to quell the ever-increasing violence that raged from 1969, when
British troops had been sent into the streets, to 1972. The Stormont
government resorted to internment, a device used intermittently to
detain without positive proof those people suspected of participating
in republican actIvItIes.
This time, they attempted wholesale
internment that embittered the vast majority of the Roman Catholic
community.
The series of demonstrations continued, and on January
30, 1972, a detachment of British paratroopers shot 13 protesters
dead in what became known as "Bloody Sunday."
As a result,
Stormont's authority was revoked by the British government, and
Westminster assumed direct rule of Northern Ireland.
Unionism splintered into many different branches for the first
time in its history. Arthur and Jeffery, in their capsule history of the
recent conflict, have described the state of Unionist politics at this
time:
A consequence of this division was that it left the
way open for someone or some party to exploit the
divisions in unionism in an atlempt to claim leadership of all unionists . . .The intensity of this bailIe
led to such acrimony and .exaggerated pledges that
rational debate became impossible within the camp.
As a result unionists tried to outbid each other in
their claims to be the true loyalists.
In tum, this
induced unrealistic expectations of what they might
secure from the government in terms of their political future and it made them incapable of negotiating a meaningful compromise with their political
opponellts. 2R

With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that despite this
multiple fragmentation of the unionists, there were still some clearly
divisive issues between the Protestant and Roman Catholic
commumtles, particularly in the 1973 General Election.
In Northern
Ireland, the main isslIe was whether the British governments plan
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for "power-sharing" between Protestants and Catholics (the
Sunningdale initiative) was to be put into force.
Battle lines were
drawn between the pro-Faulkner Unionists, who backed the titular
head of the UUP, Brian Faulkner, in his approval of Sunningdale, and
the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), a coalition of the rest of
the Unionists who opposed the plan.
The main points of contention
most Unionists had with Sunningdale were that it would give
Northern Irish Catholics a numerically disproportionate voice in the
governing of the province, and particularly that it called for the
establishment of a Council of Ireland, that provided for
representatives of both the northern and southern parliaments to
meet to decide matters of common concern. To many Unionists, this
seemed to be an acknowledgement by the Westminster government
that the Republic of Ireland had a legitimate right to influence
Northern Irish affairs. Thus, the "Irish Dimension," which seemed so
logical to consensus oriented British politicians, was anathema to
much of the Ulster Protestant population. The result of the election
was a resounding "No" from the protestant population, for the uuue
received 51 % of the total vote in the province, meaning that roughly
80% of the Protestant community voted for the UUUC.2 9
This blow to the legitimacy of Sunningdale was followed up by
the 1974 Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) general strike. For ten days,
Protestant workers in crucial industries (particularly those who
manned the power stations) combined with strong-::umers in the
Protestant paramilitary groups to virtually shut down Northern
Ireland.
Strategical and military concerns tied the hands of the
Labour government, and the stipulations of Sunningdale were
revoked. A notable point about this strike is that it defied common
perceptions of what moti vates workers to a general strike.
Rather
than some orthodox Marxian expression of proletarian outrage, the
UWC strike of 1974 was a conservative strike that was consciously
organized to maintain the political status quo of direct rule from
Britain.
While many protestants saw direct rule as perhaps the
"lesser of two evils", they preferred it to taking steps towards the
loss of the constitutional link with Britain.
This working-class
political initiative was singular, and instead of heralding a "new age"
of proletarian politics in Northern Ireland, it paved the way for a
return to the old political struggle for the mantle of leadership of the
Unionist party. In 1977, another strike was announced.
However, it
was a failure, and it also resulted in the hreakup of the UUUC.
By the early 1980s there seemed to he two main contenders
for the Unionist throne-the Official Unionist Party(OUP), direct
descendant of the Ulster Unionist Party, headed hy the quiet James
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Molyneaux, and the Democratic Unionist Party(DUP), which had been
created by the vociferous Ian Paisley in the early 1970s. 30
The
UUP's electoral support was somewhat battered from the leadership
struggles of the previous decade hut it still claimed the largest
percentage of the Unionist vote.
The DUP, on the other hand, had
gone from being a "minor irritant on the unionist periphery" to being
the second-largest party in Ulster unionism)! A glance at Table I
will show how the two have fought elections in the past decade often
within close margins of one another. Generally it can be said that the
UUP fares better in Westminster elections than the DUP, and that the
bulk of the DUP's representation is at the local level. While in the
past few years the DUP seems perhaps to have reached a plateau in
its growth of support, it remains a vibrant and extreme voice of
Protestant Unionism.
Table I
1982
1983
1985
1987
1986
(Assem.}
(Westmin} (Loc. Gvt.}
(Westmin} (Westmin}
29.4%
UUP
29.7%
34.0%
51.7%
37.8%
20'()%
24.3%
14.6%
DUP
23.0%
11.7%
The moderate end of Protestant politics is contained within the
Alliance Party. Though it can only loosely he classed as a 'unionist'
party, the religiously-mixed Alliance deserves mentioning, for the
fact that this rather moderate, consensus-oriented party attracts
support from both communities.
The Marxist historian Michael
Farrell has described it as:
A non-sectarian moderate Unionist party.
Committed
to maintaining the link with Britain but reforming the
Northern state.
Set up in April 1970 and has substantial
Catholic membership as well as Protestant membership.
Its support and membership is overwhelmingly middle-c1ass.3 2

As the persistence of the conflict in. Northern Ireland will attest, the
tolerant message of the Alliance Party has largely gone unheeded,
and those subscribing to the party arc only a fraction of the total
Protestant population.
Their electoral base has been evaluated by
Arthur and Jeffery:
[The Alliance Party J did not seem to relate to the emotions
of the combatants, and it was this self-conscious thrust
towards reason and reasonableness which appears may have
made it redundant. . . When intercommunal tensions rise Alliance
support dips . . . While it can hope to muster about 10% of the
total vote, it cannot, however, hope to form a government at
some future date) 3

Their views are significant, however, because the Alliance party is
the often disparagingly described "mythical center" in Northern Irish
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politics that seeks a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern
Ireland through mutual compromise. This sort of consensus politics,
however, is the sort of "creeping Republicanism" that the most
garrisonistic of Ulster Protestants fear-the politics of Lundies, in
other words.
Indeed, there seems to be evidence for this contention
in the electoral patterns of Alliance.
If, as asserted in the above
quote, Alliance support fades in times of crisis, it seems entirely
logical that this is substantially due to increased garrisonism amongst
Ulster Protestants, for if the communal dichotomies are sharper than
normal, it seems that the majority of Protestants would be even less
disposed to seek compromise.
In summation, we can see that there were four broad stages in
the development of present-day unionism.
The first parallels the
rise and semi-fruition of the Irish Home Rule movement in the late
nineteenth century.
Here the links between Protestantism and
unionism were forged and given political expression.
The second
stage ,was the Stormont years of 1922-1972, called "Fifty years of
Unionist misrule" by civil rights marchers but looked on as the
"Golden Age of Ulster Unionism" by many Protestants. The turbulent
O'Neill years that preceded the current conflict brought about the
first insurmountable fissures in the Unionist Party's history, and the
dogfight that followed to be the flagship of unionism, compose the
third stage. Finally, the present situation finds the UUP and the DUP
cautiously trading barbs but neither actively seeking the destruction
of the other, and this is the fourth stage of Unionist development. In
the next chapter, I plan to examine how the differences between the
Protestant denominations provide at least a plausible explanation for
these divisions in Ulster Unionism, and to draw a few conclusions
about the parallels between religious and political behavior in the
Ulster Protestant commun ity.
I Counties Antrim. Down. Tyrone. Armagh. Londonderry. fermanagh. Donegal.
Cavan. and Monaghan. The first six counties make up present-day Northern
Ireland; oftentimes. Unionists will use "Ulster" as a synonym for Northern
Ireland.
2Lyons,!reland Since the Famine.p. 290-2.
3Harbinson. Ulster Unionist Party. p.1R.
4Sheane. Ulster's British Connection. p.174.
5Miller.Queen's Rebels.p. 64.
6Lyons,!reland Since the Faminc.p.20-1.
7/bid .• p.292 .
8Nevin,lrish Dimension.p.8.
Though not exactly contemporary to the 1886
Home Rule bill, Ihis philosophy seems to have heen alive and well at the time.

9lbid., p.8.
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10Brooke,Ulster Presbyterians,p.199.
11 Lyons,lrcland Since the Famine,p.291.
12Lyons,lrcland Since the Famine, p. 31S.
13TK Daniel, unpublished lecture, Jan. lS,l(NO.
14Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine,p.30S-10.
15S e ll,Protestant.\· of Ulster,p.1S.
16Miller, Queen's Rehels,p.118-120.
17Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Per.lpalivc,p.flS.
1 RNelson, Ulster's Uncertain Dl'jcn£iers,p. ')6.
19 England in the Twentieth Cel/tIlry, p.74.
20Ne Ison, Ulster's U'II"ertain Dc/enders,p. 3 (l-V).
21/hid.p.36
22Por example, in the 1967 council elections, Derry's 14,429 Catholic
voters(61 % of the total Co. Londonderry electorate) were only able to elect
eight out of twenty council members. Arthur and Jerrery,Northern Ireland
Since 1968,p.5.
23Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party,p.S2.
24Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders,p.4S-6.
25Ibid.,p.49-50; Arthur and Jeffery,Northern Ireland Since 1968,p.6-8.
26Nelson,Ulster's Uncertain Defenders,p.49-S0.
27Ibid.,p.62.
2RArthur and Jeffery, Northern Ireland Since 1968,p.S3.
29 As one's religion is not asked when one is about to vote, this is by necessity a
rough estimate.
Assuming that this SI % was Protestant, this percentage equals
a total of 510,000 Protestants who voted for the UUUc.
At this time, there were
approximately 660,O()0 Protestants in the province.
A little math shows that
77.3% of these Protestants voted for the UUUC.
30lbid.,p.57-60.
3 1II} i d. , p . 5 8 .
32Farrell,Northcrn Irdand:the ()nlllg{~ Stale,p.3S0.
33Arthur and .Idlery,Nortlwrn Ireland Since !CJ68,p,(1()-1.
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ANGLICANS AND PRESRYTERJANS
Having outlined the basic history of the Ulster unionism and
briefly discussed its role in the Northern Irish political environment,
I will now describe the what I consider to be the major cleavage
dividing the Protestant community: the differences between the
major denominations in Northern Ireland.
The two primary
Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland are the Church of
Ireland and the various Presbyterian churches.
Between them, they
claim 82% of the Protestant population of the province.! Despite the
fact that they appeared in Ireland at approximately the same time,
these
groups
have different theological
beliefs
and
their
memberships have noticeable geograph ic and socio-economic
characteristics.
These differences call into question the conventional
wisdom that holds the Protestants of Northern Ireland to be a
monolithic group.
As I have previously mentioned, these variances have not
received the attention given other, more glaring differences In
Northern Irish politics, particularly those between the Protestant and
Roman Catholic communities in the province.
Though hardly the
decisive factor in Northern Irish politics, the differences between the
Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians serve as divisive factors
within the Unionist community for two major reasons: one, the
Church of Ireland's history of advantage, both economic and political,
is mirrored by a history of Anglican discrimination against the
Presbyterian churches; and two, the theologies of the two bodies lead
to friction between the fundamentalist Presbyterians and the more
liberal Anglicans of the Church of Ireland. The political ramifications
of this are that, one, the Church of Ireland has developed in relative
security, and thus is traditionally more amenable to compromise, and
two, the relatively liberal theology ()f the Church of Ireland makes its
members more tolerant of the religious differences between it and
the Catholic church, thus removing a major barrier to compromise
with the religious community.
That is, since its views are at least
formally similar to the Catholic church's, it is more difficult for
Anglicans to view the Roman Cathol ic commun i ty as spiri 1U ~t1ly
wayward or in danger of eternal damnation.
Thus, these Anglican
qualities lead to mistrustful feelings amongst a substantial portion of
the Presbyterian membership.
Their hi story of rugged defi ance in
the face of persecution combined with their strict, fundamentalist,
Calvinistic religious views make them much more intolerant of
differences and much more unlikely to compromise on any issue
with the Roman Catholic community.
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Though this chapter is primarily concerned with examInIng the
differences between the memberships of the Church of Ireland and
the Presbyterians, it must also be noted that they share one
important characteristic that overshadows many of these other
frictions: when one looks at the island as a whole, both of these
denominations are tiny minorities compared to the Irish Roman
Catholic population.
This Catholic numerical superiority frightens
both Anglicans and Presbyterians into unison on the all-important
issue of the union with Britain.
This issue takes precedence over
virtually all internal tensions within the Ulster Protestant
community, particularly in times of cnsls. Thus, when examining the
differences between these two major denominations, it mllst not be
forgotten that they remain cohesive on this one burning and, in
Northern Ireland, supreme issue.
JIaving made this clear, it is
possible to proceed with the study of the divisions that do divide the
Protestant community.
The first major difference between the Church of Ireland and
the Irish Presbyterian churches I ies in the hi storical legacy that has
been handed down to each denomination. The history of the Church
of Ireland during its early years differs from that of its English
progenitor.
The mutual martyrdoms of individuals from either the
Church of England or the Catholic church (depending upon the winds
of political fortune) did not occur with such frequency or fervor in
Ireland. Rather, it seems that the Gaelic chieftains under the nominal
control of Henry VIII quietly submitted to conversion while their
subjects and even their households remained practicing Catho1ics.
However, in this age of wars between Protestant and Catholic states,
such a strategic island as Ireland had to be firmly under Protestant
control in order for England to be secure from attack from England's
ever-present Catholic rivals, Prance and Spain. A major step towards
this end occurred when Queen E.Iizabeth I made the Church of
Ireland the "Church, established by law" by issuing the Act of
Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity through the Irish Parliament in
1560.
Protestant control of Ireland was consolidated by the
Williamite wars of the late 1680s and early 1690s.
As the
established church, the Church of Ireland was the only religious body
officially recognized by the government for almost two and a half
centuries.
Membership was required before one could vote, own
more than a certain amount of property, or hold any political office.
The effect of this was to give a virtual monopoly on the economic and
political leadershi p of the island at least unti I the closure of the Irish
Parliament by the 1801 Act of Union, which ironically was resisted
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by the "Protestant Ascendancy," as this socio-political dominance of
the Church of Ireland's membership has been referred to.
The Union with Britain did not greatly diminish the Anglicans'
near-stranglehold on power, but the first tidings of its loosening was
the 1829 "Catholic Emancipation "-the climax of Daniel O'Connell's
successful fight to allow Irish Catholics the right to become Members
of Parliament (MP's).
Though the United Kingdom's voting
requirements still effectively excluded much of the poorer Catholic
population of the island from using the suffrage, this event heralded
the beginning of the end of Anglican control of Ireland. The Church
of Ireland was formally dis-established in 1869, meaning in theory
that all the privileges and advantages enjoyed by its members might
be enjoyed by all regardless of their faith.
However, the inertia of
prolonged influence continued only slightly diminished into at least
the early twentieth century.
For example, one researcher has noted
that compared to their percentage of the population, members of the
Church of Ireland were strongly and thus disproportionately
represented In the business anc! professional classes. 2 It is also
interesting to note a fact that was unsettling to many Protestants in
the latter part of the nineteenth century: the early leaders of the
Irish Home Rule movement, Isaac Butt and Charles Parnell, were
both members of the Church of Ireland, a fact which also is a
precedent for Presbyterian doubts about the resolve of Anglican
church members to cling to the union with Britain.
Compared to this early history of powerful political and socioeconomIc influence, the Presbyterians in Ireland were an oppressed
group.
Though Protestant, they suffered almost as greatly as
Catholics for their adherence to their faith.
Brought over from
Scotland most dramatically by the Plantation but also from the
inevitable immigration that occurs between two lands of such
proximity, the Presbyterian encoun~.erec! at best indifference and at
times open discrimination from their Anglican lords, particularly
under the post-Williamite Penal Laws that were instituted to help
establish the dominance of the Anglican church.
As one recent
Unionist MP has written of this time:
The Presbyterian found himself, or felt himself, at odds
both with Popery and with the resented predominance
of Anglican Squire and Parson.
Anglican and Dissenter
(as all non-Anglican Protestants were known), all must
pay tithes to the Church of Ellgland.]

This assumed
implies that
Presbyterians,
of Ireland as

Preudian slip on the part of the Presbyterian author
the Anglican church was somehow "foreign" to the
for, mistakenly or otherwise, he refers to the Church
the Church of England.
Given Protestant garrisonism
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towards Britain and particularly towards the English, there is
probably a deeper meaning to his phraseology than a simple
misprint.
At any rate, the payment of tithes to the established
church was not the only restriction imposed upon the Presbyterians
in Ire]and. For a time, Presbyterian marriages-and thus the children
of these marriages-were not recognized as legitimate by the
government.
Likewise, Presbyterian religious meetings were
sometimes banned, and the rigorously faithful were driven to such
acts of defiance as rowing over the twe] ve-mile stretch of choppy
water that separates Ire]and and Scotland in order to take the
Presbyterian communion.
Still more lost substantia] amounts of
property for their adherence to their faith.
PrC"sbyterian
disgruntlement with this state of affairs was quite violently
expressed in the often examined United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798.
Though a military disaster for the rebels, it is especia]ly memorable
because Irish Preshyterians hriefly united with the Roman Catholics
of the island in the hopes of gaining Irish independence. Though this
alliance quickly dissipated, Preshyterian distaste for the Protestant
Ascendancy was amply registered hy this insurgency.
What is
important about these historical facts is that persecution had the
double effect of leaving the Presbyterian pews peopled by only the
staunchest believers while at the same time creating a heritage of
strong-willed resistance to temporal tampering into either religious
or pol itical affairs i mportan t to Ulster Presbyterians.
Hence
Presbyterians were self-selected by history as those who voluntarily
took the more difficult path of commitment to a fervently followed
set of beliefs, and a resignation to the persecution that entailed. This
contrasts with the tendency for the relative complacency of the
membership in an established church(here the Church of Ireland), as
I shall later elaborate upon. 4
At the beginning of the ni~~teenth century, the Penal Laws
were repealed and open discrimination against Presbyterians became
more the exception than the rule. Still, as one author has delicately
phrased it, "relations between the Preshyterians and the Church of
Ireland were anything but cordial. "5
In the 1840s, there were also
schisms in the Presbyterian church that led to the creation of the
Non -subscri bi ng and Non -conformi n g branches of the ch urch.
Though considered extremely important at the time of the break, the
actual theological disputes are relatively inconsequential to the focus
of this paper.
Still, this tendency to split is representative of the
powerful insistence upon personal interpretation of scripture that is
a basic part of the inherent fundamentalism of the Presbyterian
church.
It also shows to what lengths some strong-willed
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Presbyterians are prepared to go in oreler that their personal beliefs
will be satisfied, for it IS deemed better to dissociate than to risk
"spiritual contamination" as a result of compromise about firmly held
beliefs.
To change focus, it is helpful to examine the political behavior
of both Anglican and Dissenters in the nineteenth century.
Even at
this time there was a decided difference between the political
behavior of the two groups.
Part of this difference was the
traditional association of the established church in both England and
Ireland with the Conservative Party. Often called the "Tory Party at
prayer," the Anglican Church of Ireland shared this connection with
its English progenitor.
Conversely, the Presbyterians tended towards
the opposing political viewpoint of the Liberal Party. Describing both
this condition as well as the ramifications of the 1798 rebellion upon
Presbyterians, Stewart has written that:
If the Presbyterians ceased to be nationalists. they
did not cease to be liberals. and they instinctively
chose the opposite side politically from the Tories of
the Established Church.
Although conservative
Presbyterians and Anglicans grew closer together.
especially after Catholic Emancipation. Liberalism
(with a capital 'L') was still strong in Ulster until

1886. 6

Thus, the Home Rule issue took precedence over fundamental
Presbyterian opposition to the religious and political views of many of
the members of the Church of Ireland.
In a less tumultuous political
landscape the existing political cleavages would in all likelihood have
caused readily noticeable factional infighting.
This did not occur
during the fight against the Home Rule bills. Thus, contentious rivalries
were subordinated in the face of the rise of a greater threat: Irish
Home Rule and the resulting growth of the Roman Catholic power in
Ireland.
As has already been stated many times, the prospect of
Roman Catholic power forced Prot'e"st"ants to resolve their differences
or lose their combined political influence. Though the political history
of the two groups from this point onwards is basically that of
unionism, it should not be inferred that the Presbyterians and the
Church of Ireland became one homogenous group.
They created a
political coalition, and were thus a group formed from diverse
interests who shared the defeat of Home Rule as their primary
political goal.
These different historical heritages have produced a number of
current distinctions between the Presbyterians and the Anglicans in
the north of Ireland.
For example, the Church of Ireland and the
Presbyterians differ demographically from one another.
Most of
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Ul ster' s Presbyterian popul ation is contai ned In the two Belfast
counties of Antrim and Down, and they tend to be more populous in
Northern Ireland's two cities, Belfast and Londonderry/Derry.7
Church of Ireland members, on the other hand, tend to reside in the
more rural areas-for example, in the two least populous counties in
Northern Ireland, Fermanagh and Tyrone, the Church of Ireland claims
the largest percentage of the Protestant population; in Fermanagh
alone, they outnumber Presbyterians almost 10 to 1.8 To these
elements of urban/rural tension are added socio-economic tensions,
for while there seems to be little difference in the actual amounts
earned by Presbyterians and Anglicans, employment that requires
"connections"-such as the civil service or the diplomatic corps- is
predominated by those from the Church of Ireland.
For example,15%
of those Church of Ireland members who have jobs are employed by
the government in the civil service, while only 5% of the Presbyterian
work force finds itself in these sought-after positions.
In the
diplomatic service, differences are even more dramatic; Church of
Ireland employees outnumbers the Presbyterians almost 3 to 1.9
Though these economic distinctions are not quite as sharp as the
geographical differences, the apparent difference in influence would
support the contention that it is still possible for Presbyterians to feel
like outsiders.
In this way, the legacy of the history of Anglican
privilege still affects political relations within the Ulster Protestant
community in two ways: subjectively, for the Presbyterians remember
the way their forefathers suffered for their faith almost as fondly as
they recall the founding of the UYF or the 1690 Battle of the Boyne;
and objectively, particularly when the differences of demography and
apparent influence are taken into consideration.
Though not as
noticeable as the differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics
in the province, these differences and their resulting tensions
contribute to and exacerbate the. gl}rrisonism of the Ulster Protestant
community.
In addition to having different histories and thus different
membership compositions as a result of this dissimilar past, the
Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian church also differ
theologically.
I contend that the primary difference between the
Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland lies in the area of scriptural
interpretation.
I n short, the Presbyteri ans tend towards a more
fundamentalist view of scripture while the Church of Ireland
subscribes to a more liberal interpretation of the Bible. According to
the religious scholar Roger Schmidt, this conflict between liberal and
fundamentalist views is the "primary division within Christendom
tod ay" .10
His definition of scriptural fundamentalism is a belief in
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the Bible as God's revealed word, thus making it either totally
inerrant or at least literally correct about doctrinal matters. On the
other hand, a liberal view of scripture is marked not only by a
critical view of the historical context of these writings, but also by
bel iefs and practices which are shaped by church traditions and
secular
knowledge. II
These traits can be observed in the
organization of the churches and in their different practices, and this
in turn highlights the fundamental/liberal dichotomy eXlsttng
between the theologies of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian
churches.
The primary difference in the organization of these two
denominations is the concept of' the source of authority regarding
church matters. In the Church of Ireland, the Archbishop of Dublin
has final authority on most issues,' with only some deference to the
Archbishop of Canterbury. Thus, power in the Church of Ireland
flows from the top to the bottom. On the other hand, the source of
power for Presbyterians resides in the individual congregations, or
Presbyteries. Delegates (usually elders or ministers) are sent to a
synod, which in turn sends delegates to the General Assembly of the
Irish Presbyterian Churches, where matters of widespread concern
are decided by majority vote.
The resemblance to modern
legislatures is clear.
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The charts help illustrate the general organizational structure
of the two denominations.
Though structurally similar, the power
flow within the bodies is the most revealing characteristic.
An
example of these differing concepts of the source of authority in
matters of church existence is wel1 illustrated by the manner in
which ministers come to their respective congregations.
In the
Church of Ireland, pastors are ordained and then assigned to a
congregation.
In the Presbyterian churches, however, ministers are
first invited to appear before a congregation for a "test" sermon, and,
"
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if the Presbytery approves, he may then be "cal1ed" by that
congregation to be its minister.
The difference in these two
procedures is that the Presbyterian mode of choosing both elders and
ministers comes straight from Paul's letter to Timothy regarding this
topic. 12
These passages describe the appointment to either of these
posItIOns as a communal decision of the individual congregation and
set forth guidelines to be considered.
On the other hand, the
Anglican church continued the practice established by its immediate
predecessor, the Roman Catholic church, which called for pastors,
priests, and the rest of the church hierarchy to be appointed by the
Archbishop.
Thus, the Presbyterians established their practice on
scriptural admonition which is a decidedly fundamentalist practice,
while the Church of Ireland followed church tradition, thus taking a
liberal view of the passages in question.
Likewise, the Presbyterian church tends to shun religious
practices which are not expressly called for by the New Testament.
For example, the use of liturgy-set prayers and responses-is
decidedly absent from Irish Presbyterian services. In fundamentalist
faiths prayers are meant to be spontaneous expressions of worship
and supplication to God. Contrari ly, the Church of Ireland, along with
other Episcopal churches, practices liturgy, embodied in the Book of
Common Prayer. Contrasting the practice of the two denominations,
the Anglican use of liturgy is a strong example of a church tradition
becoming a crucial part of the worship service.
Since the New
Testament has only one stylized prayer-the Lord's Prayer-[some
fundamentalists argue that even this is only meant as a general
guide], it can easily be seen that the Church of Ireland is more liberal
in its interpretation of scripture than the Presbyterians.
I contend that these two types of Christianity affect the voting
behavior within the Protestant community of Northern Ireland.
The
fundamentalism of the Presbyterian..~._J~ads to a greater emphasis on
personal actions and responsibilities in their religious life; this in
turn leads to a greater tendency towards personal intransigence and
activism in these people's political lives.
The large number of
Presbyterians who support the extremist Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) provides an excellent example of how this religious
stubbornness translates into uncompromising political attitudes (see
table next page). The members of the Church of Ireland, on the other
hand, with their relatively accommodating views in religious matters,
are marked by more flexible views in the political world.
Again,
their political affiliations represent this liberality, for as can be seen
there are greater percentages of ,',Anglicans in the two moderate
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unionist parties, the Alliance and the OUP, than the more numerous
Pres byterian s.

Politico-Religious
Denomination
Church of Ireland
Presbyterian
Free Presbyterian
Roman Catholic
Other Protestant*

Affiliation

% in
21.6
44.8
9.5
0.0
12.1

our
not

in

% in
44.0
31.2

Northern

our

available

0.0
24.8

IreJand 13
% of Pop.

% Alliance
23.3
22.8
0.0
44.0
9.8

18.2
23.0
1.5
28.0
29.4

*includes those who declined to state a religious preference

The statistics show that as one progresses from the more extreme
DUP to the most flexible unionist party, Alliance, (evidenced by the
proportion of Catholics), the percentages of Presbyterians drop while
those of the Church of Ireland increase.
It thus seems clear that
there are connections between a Protestant's denomination and
his/her political orientation.
Likewise, these numbers correspond
with my assertion that fundamentalism produces uncompromising
unIOnIsm.
Though it should again be clearly stated that these
differences are extremely broad and serve only as general indicators
of the political atmosphere of the Ulster Protestant community,
one
can plainly discern the trends I have been discussing.
In assessing the political ramifications of these historical and
theological differences between the Church of Ireland and the
Presbyterian churches, two primary conclusions may be drawn.
One
is that the Presbyterian history of discrimination under the
Anglicans makes the Presbyterian of today acutely aware of both
this heritage of oppression and their defiant resistance of it.
Two,
the Church of Ireland's role in this discrimination combined with
their less-fundamentalist theological stance makes Presbyterians
suspect both the Anglicans' steadfastness as well as their political
motives. Thus, the Grand Master of the Orange Order, who is also a
Presbyterian minister, can speill:· with subtle pride that his
"Presbyterian forbears knew something of the wrath of the Penal
Laws," and in this example of stubborn adherence to principles find
an example to guide him in both his religious and political behavior
of the present. 14
The eminent Irish historian A.T.Q.
Stewart
comments on this point:
I,

The Presbyterian is happiest when he is being a radical.
The austere doctrines of Calvinism, the simplicity of his ,
worship the democratic government of his church, the
memory or the Martyred Covenanters, Ihe Scottish rerusal
to yield or disscmblc--all these incline him to that difficult
and cantankerous disposition which is characleristic of a
certain kind of political radicalism.
His nalura) inslinct is
to dislrllsl Ihe oll/ward forms of civil government unless
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they arc consonant with his religious principles.
On the
other hand, his situation and his history in a predominantly Catholic Ireland have bred in him attitudes which
seem opposite to these, making him defensive, intolerant,
and uncritically to traditions and institutions.! 5

The paradox of an intense desire for religious liberty leading to an
oppression of others' right to enjoy the same thing lies at the heart of
Protestant garrisonism; likewise, the heart of garrisonism lies In
Ulster Presbyterianism. To them, the stakes in the political game of
the province are too high to allow for any compromise, be it religious
or political-indeed, the two are often treated as equivalent issues in
the political dialogue lor lack thereofl in Northern Irish circles.
If the heart of garrisonism is Presbyterianism, then :t follows
that the Church of Ireland will be less staunchly "Unionist," in the
general sense of the term, extending to such related issues as
economic concessions to Ulster's Catholic population.
These
concessions are precisely what is feared by many Presbyterians, and
thus gives rise to the concerns of many Presbyterians that the
Church of Ireland is more likely to produce "Lundies," and influential
Lundies at that, who could potentially betray all the civil and
religious liberties enjoyed by the Ulster Protestants.
As irrational as
this might sound to those familiar with the use of consensus politics
as the best way forward, it is symptomatic of the zero-sum political
environment in the province. One writer has described this fear that
haunts, even peripherally, the decisions of many Presbyterian
Unionists:
The professional and managerial classes to be round in
the Church of Ireland . . . tend to view politics in the
rationalistic and pragmatic terms common to most
soclettes.
For them, Ulster's troubles are resolvable
through balance, compromise, and mulual toleration
resolving conflict.
They would make substantial concessions to Catholics to rationalise a disrupted political
environmenl,(emphasis ~ld~i'e'd")16

In other words, Anglican loyalty to the union, to Protestantism, and,
by association to Ulster, stands the greatest chance of waveringbecause their religious liberality is of len translated into a political
liberality (in the Northern Irish context), and they are perceived to
be the most likely to become "Lundies"by many of the Ulster
Presbyterians.
This adds a special meaning to Unionist fears of the
Anglican O'Neill's reforms, for any move towards consensus on his
part was more liable to be suspected by Presbyterians of traitorous
intent than if he had been of Presbyterian stock. Though it would be
absurd to say that it was solely O'Neill's religion that made him
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suspect in the eyes of many Unionists, it would he equally mistaken
to merely ignore this aspect of the struggle.
To conclude, it seems that the differences between the two
main Protestant denominations influence Northern Irish politics in
three ways. One is that the history of rivalry and animosity between
Presbyterian and Anglican has resulted In demographic and
economic differences in the present day that lead to tangible friction
within the Ulster Unionist community.
Two, the theological
differences he tween the two denominations arise from a conflict of
fundamentalist and liberal interpretations of scripture.
This in turn
translates into varying degrees of political garrisonism represented
by the inverse proportions of memhership in the three main Unionist
parties.
Three, it seems that the heart of Ulster Protestant
garrisonism lies in Ulster Presbyterianism, for its unyielding theology
and practice produce parallel political qualities that make
compromise over apparently secular issues equally difficult.
Having examined the hasic reasons and ramifications of this
dichotomy between the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians, two
case studies from both ends of the fundamentalist/liberal spectrum
in Northern Ireland need to he examined in order to illustrate the
scope of these differences: the special case of the Reverend Ian
Paisley, and Protestant division over the nature of the ecumenical
movement.
These two studies will help to further highlight the
denominational split within Northern Irish Protestantism, one with a
predominantly political focus-the Rev. Paisley-and one with
primarily a religious focus-the ecumenical movement.
1 Moxon-Browne,Nation,Class, and Creed in Northern Ircland,p.89.
2McMinn,"Presbylery and Politics in Ireland", Month, p. 131.
3Biggs-Davidson, The Hand is Red, p.12.
4Schmidl, Exploring Religion, p.308-312.
5Barkeley, in Hurley, Irish Anglicllnis,;l,'p.··

()S.

6Stewart,Narrow Grounli,p.163.
7Norlhern Ireland Census,IIMSO,p.SO.
8Ibid.,p.50.
9Ibid.,p.89.
lOSe hm i d l, Exploring Re ligion ,p. 223.

Illbid.,p.223.
121 Timothy 3:1-9; Titus 1:6
13Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland, pp. 66, 84, 89,
96, and Northern Ireland Census 1981, p. 50. The statistics on the our had to he
interpolated from affiliation tables of the nul' and the Alliance along wilh
general denominational population statistics from the census.
14 Marlin Smyth, interview with author, 17 July 1989.
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15Stewart, Narrow Ground,p.83.
16Wall is,et.al. "Ethnicity and Evangel ism. . .",p. 300.
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"THE RIG MAN"; IAN PAISLEY
Lord, we pray this night for this land! Save us from
all our enemies! Defeat the IRA and all its evil machinationsL . . We pray that thou wouldst work in our
land, and keep us pure, and keep us uncompromising
I shouts of amen I in our Protestant convictions, and in
our stand for Christ. ..Turn Ulster back to God! Back to
the right paths of righteousness!
Smash Popery in our
land, and all its deceptions!
Deal with the ecumenical
deceivers, the peddJcrs of false gospels. We pray that
Thou would expose them for what they arc! 1

Appearances can often deceive.
What might initially appear to
be the ramblings of a street-corner preacher are words that were
fervently prayed by the man who is "the most popular politician in
Ulster in recent years," and who has been Northern Ireland's only
elected representative to the European Parliament since elections
have been held for the position (1979).2
The Reverend Doctor Ian
R.K. Paisley MP, is perhaps the most controversial figure in
Protestant politics in Northern Ireland.
One fellow Unionist called
him the "Demon Doctor", and a pair of his hiographers have said that
he "dominates the Northern Irish scene like a malign colossus."
To
his devoted following, however, his dire warnings and predictions
seemed to be proven when Northern Ireland was plunged into
political chaos in 1969, thus making him a prophet in the eyes of
some. One ardent supporter has said that Paisley "is a man raised up
by God in Ulster's hour of need."3
Paisley's divisive message has
made him famous in the British Isles as perhaps the most strident of
Ulster Unionists; however, this extremism does not relegate him to
the fringes of Northern Irish politics.
Examining this paragon of
Protestant garrisonism is important as a case study of the "siege
mentality", for his political influence in the province is massive.
There are three primary characteristics of Ian Paisley's
influence upon Northern Irish Protestant politics.
One, his religious
views are characteristic of a theologically uncompromising Calvinism
that often equates rei igious issues with pol i tical issues. For example,
its virulent anti-Catholicism leads to garrisonism hecause, in Irish
politics, a fear of Roman Catholicism automatically implies a fear of
Irish Nationalism.
Likewise, its emphasis lIpon individualism leads
to an ultra-activism that frustrates attempts at compromise.
Two,
though his theology and his politics are extreme within the Unionist
spectrum, the fact of his electoral success shows that even though all
his views may not he held by his political supporters, he strikes the
most vibrant chord of any Northern Irish politician amongst Ulster
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Protestants.
Third, the group represented by Paisley is perhaps the
most active, vocal, and u ncorn proml sIng wi th i n the Protestan t
community, and they stand firmly in the way of any political moves
that seem accomodating of the Roman Catholic community.
Before discussing the characteristics of this influence, it is
helpful to first relate some features of Paisley's personal background.
Ian Robert Kyle Paisley was born in the staunchly Protestant town of
Ballymena, County Antrim, the son of a Presbyterian minister who
was also a member of the original UVF.
His childhood was
surrounded by the political violence that occurred with the founding
of Northern Ireland in the 1920s.
In his mid-twenties he entered
the Presbyterian ministry, but soon thereafter left to form his own
church-the
Free
Presbyterian
Church-where
his
ultrafundamentalism could flourish as he saw fit.
His political activism
dates back to his teen years when he was a member of the Orange
Order. 4 Paisley emerged as a political leader, however, in the mid1950s when the Irish Republ ican Army's "Border Campaign" was at
its peak. The Border Campaign was a series of raids and bombings
primarily of army installations on the Northern Ireland-Republic of
Ireland border primarily in 1956, but which continued sporadically
until 1961.5
Paisley founded an extremist group called Ulster
Protestant Action (UPA), which, among other things, demanded the
wholesale internment of Roman Catholics suspected of Republican
actIvItIes.
The fairly swift resolution of this
outbreak of violence
and the fact that O'Neill's mildly reformist program met apparent
initial acceptance within the Protestant community meant that
Paisley's warnings of Catholic subversion made him a. voice in the
political wilderness.
lie formed the Independent Orange Order, and
the UPA was transformed into the Ulster Protestant Volunteers
(UPV), another group that was decidedly against any concessions to
the Roman Catholic minority in tJ!.~ .. province.
Though the group's
following increased as the tide of Unionist popular opinion turned
against O'Neill, it still remained a fringe group at the outbreak of
violence in August 1969.
In many Protestants' eyes, however,
Paisley had been at the very least proven more accurate than other
Unionist politicians by the events of that summer. Paisley also
contributed to the downfall of Terence O'Neill by competing against
him in O'Neill's home seat of Bannside in a 1969 general election.
Though O'Neill won the election, it was only by a margin of 1,414
votes.
This was a considerably smaller margin than had been
predicted for the previously 'safe' seat and many took this to be an
overall Unionist rejection of O'Neillite reformsJI
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Paisley's shouts of "O'Neill must go!" changed to "ChichesterClarke must go!" and ultimately into "Faulkner must go!" as the Ulster
Unionist Party (UUP) struggled to find a leader.
The Unionists
opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement formed the United Ulster
Unionist Council (UUUC).
Paisley took a leading role in this
organization.
Ironically, his popular standing seems to have taken a
fall during the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike of 1974. Paisley
initially opposed the stoppage, but as the popular will seemed to
support it, he jumped on the bandwagon.
This U-turn made him
seem less of a prophet and more of an opportunist in the eyes of
many Protestants. For example, one UWC pamphlet has said of this
campaign that, "Paisley . . . scarcely raised a ripple of concern In the
Protestant community . . . he was never so isolated politically as in the
month after Sunningdale."7
The Reverend Doctor may have been down, but he was hardly
out.
While the Unionists groped for a strong leader, Paisley's voice
carried, and indeed, still carries, a consistent message that upholds
beliefs firmly rooted in the minds of many Ulster Protestants. 8
Foremost in th is message I s a den u nc i ati on of attempts at
compromise with the Roman Catholic community, primarily for three
different reasons.
One, the "zero-sum" political culture of the
province means that similar to an athletic contest, if the Roman
Catholics win, then the Protestants must lose. Logic implies, and such
researchers as Nelson, Moloney and Pollak have claimed, that
there
is an obvious motivation to deny the Catholic community any "wins."9
Two, any "win" thus gained by the Roman Catholic community
additionally adds momentum to the IRA, who, Paisley claims, find in
this perceived victory legitimation for further acts of terrorism.
Thus, it is logical to say that Paisley feels that any unforced
compromise with the Roman Catholic community will be interpreted
as weakness by the IRA, who wou,I~LJhen be emboldened to increase
their efforts.
Three, Paisley's religious views include a fierce
opposition to the Papacy on a theological basis. Though I will later
elaborate upon the specific aspects of this, suffice it to say that
though his religious views do not have numerically that strong a
following, his political message rings true to many Ulster unionists.
As has been noted, by the early 1980s the Unionists were divided
into two main camps: the OUP, headed by Molyneaux, and the DUP
headed by Paisley, and these remain the two main camps within
Ulster Unionism at the present time.
Ian Paisley's theological beliefs have a number of interesting
characteristics.
One of these IS an uncompromising hatred of the
Roman Catholic church with a ferocity reminiscent of the
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Reformation.
BeIl has said that "when Paisley thundered against the
Catholic Church he was not criticizing a religious institution or an
erroneous interpretation of the Bible; he was taking on the Devil
himself."lo By saying this, Bell means that Ian Paisley literalIy
believes that the Pope to be the Antichrist.
Indeed, there is
considerable self-testimony to this effect. I I For example, Paisley
wrote in a tract denouncing the Papal visit to the United Kingdom lf1
1982 that:
The Popes of Rome for centuries have, under the title
of Vicar of Christ, been masquerading as Christs.
Ever
since the Bishop of Rome got a taste for power early in the
Christian era, he yeIJed,'" am Christ", and right down
to Pope John Paul " they have been yeIJing it, shouting
it, trumpeting it, and parroting it. . . This is the confession
of the Antichrist.
Thank God we recognize him.l2

Likewise, Paisley has written the
unsurprisingly titled Antichrist :

following

passage

In

a

tract

The Pope, the Vicar of Christ, is the Man of Sin(prophesied
by the Scriptures).
lie has invented sin, he has taught sin,
he has enacted sin, established iniquity by law, he trades in
sins and has grown rich through the sins of Christendom.
Sin is the Pope's work. Sin is the Pope's being. Popery is the
incarnation of sin as the Gospel is the incarnation of holiness.
The policy of the Pope as Antichrist is not to deny truth but
to pervert truth. l 3

Besides revealing the fact that Paisley helieves the Pope to be the
Antichrist, this passage also shows two other important aspects of
Paisley's theology.
By saying the Pope perverts truth, Paisley is
automatically wary of the initiatives of the Roman Catholic church,
for hy this test, no matter how logical a Catholic initiative might
appear, it is fundamentalIy evil according to Paisley's theology, and
thus he opposes it.
Furthermore, by call ing the Gospel the
"incarnation of holiness", Paisley gives the reader some idea of the
depth of his fundamentalism.
When these dimensions of Paisley's theological beliefs are
acknowledged, his extreme garrisonism begins to make more sense.
If a united Ireland means a rise to power of the Catholic church, then
Paisley's homeland would be controlled hy the Antichrist, and that
would be unthinkable.
This view of Roman Catholicism as evil
incarnate makes compromise with the Roman Catholic community
virtually impossihle.
This opposition to the Papacy is also a prime
example of how religion and politics overlap one another in the
figure of Ian Paisley, and hy association, the politics of Northern
Ireland.

41
The Reverend's justification for his VIew of the Pope as
Antichrist is dependent upon a strict reading of the Book of
Revelations and passages from Matthew 24:5, along with a sprinkling
of Old Testament prophecies. 14
This strict interpretation of scripture
is a salient point of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalism that pervades all
of his preaching and political proselytizing. For example, Paisley has
written that the "three most important duties of religion" are private
prayer, Bible reading, and meditation upon these passages.
The
personal, individualistic nature of these tasks are fairly obvious
In
light of both his insistence upon scriptural literality and the primary
responsibility of the individual to actively pursue this "divinely
revealed" course, Paisley clearly fulfills the definitbn of a
fundamen tal i s t.
I-I a vi n g not e d t his, i t i s p r u den t toe x amI n ePa i s ley's
relationship with mainstream Presbyterianism.
His general relation
to Presbyterianism has been assessed by B rooke, who described it as
both "overlapping" yet "independent" from Ulster Presbyterianism,
with the primary difference being both an emphasis upon individual
converSIOn and a strong commitment to their "new Life" as one born
agai n .15
McSweeney more directly states that:
. . .Northern Ireland's mainstream Preshyterianism
differs from the fundamentalist evangelical Preshyterianism typified by Ian Paisley oilly in fervour and
intensity of belief. I 0

Thus Paisley's Free Presbyterianism is a focused, extreme brand of
Presbyterianism that takes the inherent fundamental qualities of
Irish Presbyterianism (i.e, scriptural literality and individual
responsibility) and emphasizes them nearl y to the point of
fanaticism.
This emphasis upon the individual, both through personal
commitment and the pursuance of an active faith extends into the
political arena. Paisley and his DUP· are perhaps the most vocal and
outspoken party in the Northern Irish political landscape.
For
example, Paisley went to the European Parliament to denounce a
visit by the Pope so vociferously that he was almost forcibly
removed from the chamber. Likewise, when a Roman Catholic priest
addressed an ecumenical gathering in the Church of Ireland's St.
Anne's Cathedral in Belfast, a group of Paisleyite demonstrators stood
outside chanting "No Pope I [ere", among other things. When speaking
about the IRA hunger strikers in 1981, Paisley stated that, "We have
a choice to make.
Shall we allow ourselves to be murdered by the
IRA or shall we kill the killers?"!7
After the OUP MP for South
Belfast, the Reverend Robert Bradford, was assassinated hy the IRA,
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memorial speeches were made in the House of Commons.
During
these speeches, fel t to be "hypocritical" by many Unionists present,
Paisley made "heated interventions" that led to his being suspended
from the chamber. 18
Is Paisley conscious of how his views, both political and
religious, are viewed by the outside world?
Most definitely; this is
another importan t aspect of Pai s leyi te and indeed, Presbyteri an,
activism-one is required to suffer if he is proclaiming a truth of
which the world, blinded by sin and Satan, does not approve.
For
example, Paisley has written in one religious tract that:
The voice of the [Protestant] martyr is heard in heaven.
The text describes it as a 'loud voice' to which the Lord
gives immediate attention.
The voice of the martyrs is
stifled and muffled by men on earth and those who would
draw allention to their principles and sacrifices and
indict the Roman murdress are discountenanced and discredited.
In heaven, however, their voice is heard and
their faithfulness rewarded.
Yes, and let it be remembered
their illustrious roll is not yet completed.
More of God's
choice people will fall prey to the beast of Rome before
God hurls His final anathema upon the whole Hellish
system of Popery.
The killing times and martyr pyres
will shortly be again the experience of those who stand
up for Christ against the Roman Antichrisl. 19

The clear implication is that those who are "standing firm" today in
the face of a world calling for consensus are following in the
footsteps of those martyrs venerated by Ulster Protestants.
It is
equally clear that Paisley believes that those committed to God's
work are certain to be persecuted, and, like the early Christians who
beseeched the Emperor Nero to feed them to the lions, Paisley seeks
controversy and demands his followers to take an actively
uncompromISing,
obstructionist stance
both
religiously
and
politically.
Though Paisley's Pree Presbyteri-an church claims the al1egiance
of 11,000 Northern Irish members (around 2% of the Protestant
population of the province), his DUP has consistently received a
larger proportion of the total vote than Free Presbyterian numbers
alone could provide; this has already been outlined in the previous
chapter on Unionism. 2o
Por example, one survey of Democratic
Unionists found a large percentage of mainstream Presbyterians and
other Protestant denominations (Methodists, Baptists, etc.) with a
number of A ngl icans as wel1. 21 This should not be surprising, for I
have emphasized all along that the Presbyterian/ J\ ngl ican dichotomy
is a relative one. There arc decided differences, but these are not so
strong that they can in any way be considered to be absolutes. Thus
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it seems that Paisley's religious views do not greatly hamper his
political popularity. One researcher has assessed this quality:
Paisley's dual role as leader of a church and political
party is one ingredient of his success.
Although not
all his political supporters would subscribe to his doctrinal views, there seems no douht that Paisley's own
brand of Protestantism provides an ideology that bears
the same relation to the DUP's political tactics as Marxism
docs to a Communist party in Eastern Europe. The
ideology serves to legitimize political actions, it serves
as a unifying force, but it is Oexible enough to be
adapted to alternative policies in the pursuit of broadly
similar goals. 22

Thus it seems that while theology is a foundation for Unionist
extremism, the actual number of those subscribing to Paisley's
particular sect paradoxically make up only a small portion of his
political organization, the DUP. Bell has commented upon this state of
affairs:
Protestant evangelists do not make up the majority
of Protestants in Northern Ireland and it is not the defence
of the social morality and the Protestant ethic which
motivates the majority of the Protestants, but there are
enough evangelists and enough moral outrage to have
given Paisley a hearing and a following, and when he
turned his brilliant oratory, his destructive wit, and his
political allention to Unionist traitors, many more
listened and followed.
What the 'Big Man' promised was
salvation: salvation from heretical faiths, and from
political compromisers. 21

If anything, Paisley and his followcrs posc a formidable barrier to
compromise in Northcrn Ireland.
What explains the political attraction of a man who virtually
anywhere else (excepting the American South) would be considered
a religious fanatic?
There are a number of reasons that have been
forwarded, but there are three that .?t?cm to have more validity than
others. One holds that Paisley's rhetoric is simply a new twist on the
old, traditional Ulster Unionist message: "No Surrender."
As Nelson
has pointed out, Paisley has combined tradition, recurring strands in
Ulster political I ife (i.e., "the vital Iink between reI igion and politics",
limited legitimation of Protestant political violence, and social
conservatism) with a new and dynamic focus for political
socialization-the DUP.24 She has written that Paisley:
. . . expressed the beliefs of Protestants who saw a
vital link between religion and politics, who viewed
Protestantism as under constant threat from a mono·
lithic and aggrandising Catholic Church. 25
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Thus it seems that this explanation holds Paisley's electoral success
to be rooted in the past and in the old fear that "Home rule means
Rome rule."
In the same vein, another observer has felt that it was this
commitment to traditional "Ulster values" that is the key to Paisley's
popularity:
Ian Paisley has achieved his very considerable degree
of success among Ulster Protestants because he has been
able in both manner and message to project the traditional image and identity of conservative Ulster Protestantism.
In the absence of a clear national consciousness,
an identity formulated in terms of evangelical Protestantism
is ultimately the only viable one for defending the cO'1tinued social and cultural autonomy and dominance of Ulster
loyalists, even for many working-class Protestants who
have long since ceased to be religiously observant. 26

In effect, these researchers are saying that evangelical Protestantism
is the only basis that supports the continued separation of Northern
Ireland from the rest of the island. This quote also seems to support
the idea that religion serves as the foundation of Unionist extremism.
While religion is not the primary reason for Protestants' strident
support of the link with Britain, it provides a basis for maintaining
the siege mentality.
Those who are not religiously active but share
the same political garrisonism of their pious neighbors join with
them in the face of the common threat of Cathol icism, embodied in
the possibility that Northern Ireland might become part of the Irish
Republic.
While it is extremely simplistic to argue that fear of
Catholicism as a religious entity is the primary motivation guiding
Ulster unionists, it is equally important to not dismiss entirely the
importance of religion as a political rallying point for the Protestant
community.
Similar to the previous description of the origins of Paisley's
popularity, some attribute Paisley's success to the inherent
garrisonism of many Ulster Protestants.
Moloney and Pollak contend
th at:
The real key to Paisley's power is that he mirrors the
insecurity that lurks deep within all Northern Ireland
Unionists, the belief that everywhere there arc enemies
conspiring against them.
Paisley feeds that paranoia with
one hand but with the other calms it with his own certainty.27

That is, Paisley stirs up extremism, but his faith that unionism wi11
trlu,mph in the end helps to reassure unionists who subscribe to this
pin'nacle of garflsonlsm.
These somewhat unsympathetic biographers go on to elaborate upon this point:
One of Paisley's greatest strengths is his intimate
knowledge of the peculiarly politico-religious

paranoia of Loyalism.
He is as skillful as any fanatical
Muslim leader in whipping it up in his people.
And
his methods are similar.
'He has brainwashed them
into believing that protecting Ulster is a holy crusade',
says one prominent ex-follower.
'They are fighting
for God, and God's a Protestant and an Orangeman,
as everyone knows, and so fie must want Ulster to stay
as It IS.
Anybody who says anything else is the enemy.'28

It seems that they feel Paisley's activism to the possible point
martyrdom is a major component of Protestant garrisonism, at Ie
for the supporters of the DUP. This is what is usually implied wI
one "fights for God". Such narrow views lie at the heart of Paisle
support, and they are pcrpctuated by his unyielding commitment
them.
The religious aspccts of Paisley's politics are emphasized ml
clearly by the sympathctic biographer Smyth.
He draws comparis(
between Paisley and the "politiciscd fundamentalists in the Uni1
States", particularly in four areas.
One, he observes that they b<
share a patriotic idealism that borders upon chauvinism for th
homeland; two, that there is an inhercnt di strust of government a
particularly of the motives of mainstream politicians; three, there
the perception that pcrsonal I ibcrtics are threatened by outsi
forces, be it from communism or Irish nationalism(Paisley fe,
both); and four, Paislcy's rigid dctcrmination to rcsist changes whi
promote "liberalisation in moral attitudcs" is cxtremely similar to t
campaIgns of such fundamentalist watchdogs as the Mor
Majority.29
Part of Smyth's reasoning behind this claim
undoubtedly the fact that Ian Paisley reccived his doctorate fro
Bob Jones University in Greeneville, SC.
lIe summarized Paisley
political absorption of these qualities:
This ideology has been shaped by Scottish seventeenth
century Presbyterian political theory with its emphasis
on a form of contractural.. ~n~gial1ce, and by twentieth
century American Fundament al ist revival ism with its
strong populist appeal and love of country.
Paisley's
particular talent has been to graft Ol1to the political
principles of his covenanting forefathers all the energy,
financial acumen, and brashness of the f-'undamentalist
Protestant sects of the us.3 0

It should be noted that this reference to the contractural theory c
governmental relationships is identical to Miller's assertion i
Queen's Rehels that a major reason for Ulster Protestant garrisonisr
is that they sti" rely upon a contractural theory of politics [oriente ,
primarily between the regent and hi slher subjects 1 whi Ie main I ani
Britain has movcd onto to a Parliament-dominatcd form 0
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government that makes the constitutional position of Northern
Ireland inherently unstable) 1
As a result of this fiery style of religio-political motivation that
is readily observable in Paisley's background, the DUP responds by
being one of the most vocal and activist groups in the province. One
of the primary reasons for this is Paisley himself.
As the founder
and leader of Democratic Unionism, he is the natural initiator of his
party's political actions.
Since he believes so fervently in both
individual responsibility and the necessity of individual activism in
religious matters, and since he also frequently fuses religious and
political issues, the OUP follows his lead and tends to participate in
more vocal and noticeable forms of protest, such as the
aforementioned "No Pope Here" demonstration outside of St. Anne's.
Studies of the background of those who are presumably the most
activist OUP members (the politicians themselves) have also shown a
larger proportion of free Presbyterians than make up the OUP
electorate. 32
Even those who are not members of the Free
Presbyterian Church tend to be evangelical Christians from other
denominations such as the Methodists and the Baptists. This tends to
support the concept of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalist, ultra-activist
theology being representative of the essence of Protestant
garrisonism as well as upholding the validity of the contention that
religious fundamentalism
frequently gives rise to political
33
garrisonism.
Bruce has noted this similarity of religious and
political activism, as well as the phenomena of the non-religious
voting for Protestant fundamentalists:
. . .even non-evangelicals recognize that evangelicalism
symbolizes the heart of their Unionism, and that political
goals are best pursued by evangelicals) 4

That is, since the theological fear of Catholicism is so strong, and the
tradition of individual dedication and activism is so long, it seems
evident that the religio-political activists of the OUP are the more
inflexible of the two Unionist parties, and thus are the "safer bet" for
the more garrisonistic voters that compose a considerable portion of
the Ulster Protestant electorate.
There seem to be three main conclusions that may be drawn
about the way that Ian Paisley influences Protestant politics in
Northern Ireland.
One is his religious extremism; Paisley's theology
is such that it directly affects the way political issues are debated in
the province.
lIe bel ieves the Pope to be the A ntichrist, and this
makes Catholics either dupes in the hands of Satan or active soldiers
in the army of the Antichrist. This obviously makes Paisley, and by
association his followers, reluctant to compromise with the Roman
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Catholic community.
Two, despite the fact that Paisley himself is
extreme within Unionism both theologically and politically, he enjoys
widespread electoral support. This suggests that a considerable bulk
of Ulster Protestant society is affected hy a sense of garrisonism, for
even though they might feel Paisley to he more extreme in many
ways than themselves, he is a "safe het" who can he counted upon to
not allow the IRA to scare him or British politicians to sway him into
supporting anything that might in any possible scenario lead to a
united Ireland.
Three, the group represented by Paisley, the DUP
and the Free Presbyterian Church, are perhaps the most actIvIst
groups involved in Northern Irish politics short of the paramilitaries.
Their activism may be accurately perceived as a potent expression of
fundamentalist religio-political behavior that is inherent 10 the
heritage and theology of mainstream Ulster Presbyterianism.
Thus,
it can be said that Ian Paisley glaringly personifies the
fundamentalism that serves as a basis for Ulster Protestant
garrisonism.
The example of Ian Paisley shows the vital link between
religion and politics in the Ulster Protestant community, and shows
how it is paradoxically both a unifying and a divisive factor. Even
though he enjoys immense political popularity, there is hardly
unanimity ahout his theological rhetoric or political tactics.
In the
next chapter I will discuss the ecumenical movement, which shows
that there are those in the Ulster Protestant community, again
distinguished primarily hy denomination, who feel the divisiveness
of a leader like Paisley to he both outdated and unnecessarily
inflammatory.
I Paisley,"Why No True Ulster Protestant Would Swallow the Ecumenical Pill",
sermon. Martyrs Memorial Recordings,Bel fast.
2Wallis,et.al."Ethnicity and Evangelism:lan Paisley and Protestant Politics 10
Northern Ireland" .p.299.
3Moloney and Pol/ak,Paisley. p.I-2.
4Ibid.,p.29-30.
5For a more detailed description of the Border War, see Mallie and Bishop,
Provisional IRA, pp.40-S.
6Bruce, God Save Ulster,p.23.
7Worker's Association,"The UWC Strike( 1974),p. 11.
8Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, p. 176. "Paisley's name for speaking out-saying
publicly and loudly what many Protestants thought privately was, and is, one
of the key reasons for his political success."
9Nel son, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, p.36-39
IOBel/,Protestants of Ulster,p.42.
Ilpaisley,No Pope Ilere,p.94;Paisley,Antichri.l'l,p.16.
12Ibid., p.63.
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13Ibid.,p.57.
14 "Many shall come after me, saymg 'I am Christ"'.
For the interested, the
telling number "666" is found to he on the Pope's tiara.
According to Paisley,
the words VICARIVS FILII DEI-God has told us-is written upon it. If one adds
up the Roman numerals contained within this passage, it equals 666. 1=1, V=5,
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THE EClJMENICAL MOVEMENT IN IRELAND
Much of this project has thus far focused upon the divisions
and denominational distinctions between the most influential
Protestant churches.
We have examined the differences between the
mainstream Presbyterian churches and the Church of Ireland, and
have just concluded a study of perhaps the most religiously and
politically divisive figure in Northern Irish politics, the Reverend Ian
Paisley.
The frictions between the more fundamentalist elements
contained primarily within the Presbyterian churches and the more
theologically liberal members of the Church of Ireland arise from a
number of factors we have already examined. The history of
Anglican advantage and present apparent social influence combined
with their critical approach to scriptural interpretation make the
more fundamentalist, historically rugged and uncompromlsmg
Presbyterians fearful that the Anglicans are
liable to seek some sort
of political and religious compromise with the Roman Catholic
community.
These compromises are not simply politically
undesirable to many Presbyterians. They represent a palpable threat
to the Presbyterian style of worship, they seem inherently immoral
to the more ex t reme.
It is this fear of compromise that brings us to the next part of
this study.
Here we will examine the divisions within the Ulster
Protestant community that have arIsen because of the greatest
theological compromise to be seriously considered smce the
Reformation: the ecumenical movement.
Again, these differences
tend to be ones of degree.
All the Protestant churches in Northern
Ireland are a bit leery of ecumenical union with the Roman Catholic
church.
However, the differences between
the Protestant
denominations that manifest themselves in both religion and politics
show themselves clearly in the varied denominational responses to
the ecumenical movement.
The Anglican Church of Ireland is the
major church in the province that supports the ecumenical trend,
while the Presbyterian church seems primarily opposed to even
considering such a un i on.
Of course, Pai sley's free Presbyterian
Church is decidedly and actively opposes the ecumenical movement
in any form.
Before pursuing a more detailed discussion of the evidence
supporting this claim, it would first be appropriate to examine the
wider ecumenical movement, and then proceed to a close-up of the
movement in Northern Ireland.
The ecumenical movement
arose
from Pope John XXIII's calIing of the Second Vatican Council in the
mid-1960s, more commonly known as Vatican II, which sought to
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re-ev al uate Roman Cathol ic doc tri nes and teac hi ngs.
While
important for such internal changes as relaxing some of the stricter
papal doctrines, the main thrust of these reforms seemed to be an
attempt to bring centuries of Christian separation and discord to a
close. As one Ulster ecumenist has written:
Vatican II brought to an end the 'icy wind' of
Pius IX's Syllabus ErrorlIIn and Pius Xl's Encyclical
Mortalium Animos 1928 . . . with Vatican II the door
of hope for beller understanding and reconciliation
opened. 1

By relaxing the Papacy's theological stance towards other
churches, Vatican II began to take steps to achieve the Christian
unity summed up in the Nicene Creed's vision of "one holy, catholic,
and apostolic church. "2
Indeed, a number of encouraging precedents
existed for the pursuance of such a vision.
For example, the World
Council of Churches had been formed in 1948 from organizations
representing four mi II ion Christians who:
. . . confess the Lord Jesus as God alld saviour according
to the Scriptures and therefore seek to rulrill together
their cOllllllon calling to thc glory or OIlC Clod, father,
Son, and Holy Spirit)

Such cooperation was encouraging to those Christians who were
distressed by the apparent contradiction hetween a messiah who had
said "AlI those who calion
my name shall be saved" and the
existence of thousands of separate churches, each of whom called
upon Christ's name but who also often felt that their particular brand
of Christianity was the only 'true' way to be saved.
Though the
dream of uniting all the Christian churches has a history that dates
back to the Reformation writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin,
the opposition of the Roman Catholic church had previously been an
insurmountable barrier. 4
However, the Second Vatican Council
changed this state of affairs quite dramatically, and it opened the
door to further inter-Christian- ~dialogue and
ecclesiastical
cooperati on.
By receIvIng this Papal blessing, the latent ecumenical
movement, which before Vatican II consisted primarily of informal,
personal meetings between various church officials, began to expand.
It was, and continues to be, generally directed towards uniting the
three main branches of Christianity, namely the western Protestant
churches, the Roman Catholic church, and the Eastern Orthodox
churches. 5 Soon after the Second Vatican Council there began to be
conspicuous official interaction between these three branches.
For
example, in 1966 the Anglican Archbishop of Canterhury flew to
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Rome to meet with Pope Paul VI in order to establish meaningful
communication between the two churches. 6
In Ireland, there was an initially encouraging acceptance of
these ecumenical developments.
Indeed, tentative gestures with
decided ecumenical overtones had been begun in 1964, which
predated the enactment of the Second Vatican Council. A Church of
Ireland abbot [note his denominationl founded the Glenstal
Ecumenical Conference, which was made up of individuals from the
various churches who met for "full, free, frank discussion" where "no
findings are drawn up.
The aim is [personall enlightenment. . . "7
Though this might sound quite cautious to outside observers, in
Ireland it was seen as a significant development by many members
of both the Protestant and Catholic communities.
The primary
disagreement within these groups was whether these steps were to
be supported or opposed. Two years later the Greenhills Ecumenical
Conference was established.
lIeld during the annual Week of Prayer
for Christian Unity, this was a one-clay meeting of individuals
regardless of their Christian denomination.
Both of these were
unofficial ecumenical gatherings; that is, they were not expressly
called for by the leaderships of the various churches.
However, it
seems that the connections made at these various gatherings set the
stage for the official ecumenical meetings held at Ballymascanlon
beginning in 1973. H
These talks were attempts to clarify the
theological differences existing between the various main churches in
Ireland, and their product was a series of reports that detailed both
agreements and points of contention concerning topics such as
baptism, the Eucharist, and marriage, as well as more abstract
subjects like the relationship between the church, scripture, and the
source of ecclesiastical authority. The talks, while perhaps leading to
greater understanding amongst the various church leaderships, seem
to have stopped at th is point. Fo~ ex~mple, one commentator has had
this criticism of the Ballymascanlon meetings:
The weakness of these talks is that no procedure
has heen laid down for the implementing of its
findings, or effective provision made for bringing
the results of its work to the allention of the Churches,
especially the laity.9

In evaluating the ecumenical movement in Ireland as a whole,
then, it seems that it has enjoyed only modest success and has had
little results beyond establishing the fact that some members from
the various church administrations are on friendly terms with one
another.
When one confines his ecumenical examination to the
borders of Northern Ireland, it becomes painfully obvious that
overall, the ecumenical movement has, as one observer understated
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the case, "made only disappointing headway".1 0 Quite simply, this
seems due to the enormous obstacles presented by both the present
conflict in the province and the socio-political factors such as Ulster
Protestant garrison ism that contribute to the intractability of the
situation.
Many of these barriers are those that have been mentioned at
various points throughout this paper.
The Protestant and Catholic
communities are virtually segregated from one another.
They go to
different schools, they live in different neighborhoods, they
partICIpate either in different athletic games or in different leagues
of the same sports.
Thus, because they simply do not know each
other, ecumenism is even more difficult than in areas suc':1 as the
United States or on the European continent where Catholics and
Protestants tend to mix freely. The conflict of the last twenty years
has further emphasized the differences between Catholic and
Protestant, and this means the ecumenical movement seems
extremely strange to residents of a province where a religious
dividing line between two conflicting comlllunities has been etched
in stone for centuries. Perhaps the greatest barrier on all sides to the
ecumenical movement is the fact that reI igious loyalties usually
predispose a particular political orientation.
In this light, ecumenism
becomes illogical to the more extreme: hy destroying the differences
between the Protestants and Catholics, one would either be accepting
the link with Britain or facilitating the absorption of Ulster in the
Irish Republic.
Here the fear of religious compromise leading to
political betrayal is at its strongest.
Because "Protestant" and
"Catholic" are terms having numerous political implications in any
Northern Irish context, attempts to join the two together IS seen as
not simply a religious or ecclesiastical matter.
As one author has
stated, "Ecumenism in Northern Ireland is not just about the
Churches and their creeds and~<?.r§.hip;" it would touch virtually
every facet of their lives.!!
The perceived political implications of
ecumenism have been specifically noted by one researcher:
. . .on the Protestant side, enough people arc
persuaded that ecumenism undermines the political union with Great Britain, by minimizing
the difference between Irish Catholics and Irish
Protestants, to make the further outreach or popularisation of ecumenism a ncar-impossibility. J 2

As I have consistently argued throughout the course of this project,
generalizing about the Northern Irish Protestants does not tell the
whole story about their political situation, and this statement, though
useful as a starting point, does not reveal much about the divisions
within
the
Ulster Protestant community.
The Protestant
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denominations in Northern Ireland have responded in varying ways
to the ecumenical movement. Predictably, the Church of Ireland has
responded the most favorably to ecumenism of all the Protestant
den 0 min a t ion s. 13
On the other hand, the Presbyterians have
generally been either reluctant or openly opposed to ecumenical
overtures.
Paisley's free Presbyterian Church is diametrically and
vociferously opposed to any form of ecumenism which entails an
acceptance of the Roman Catholic Church.
Before elaborating upon
their positions, it is first necessary to examine the theological
premises of the overall ecumenical movement, for only then does the
reasoning behind each church's stance become clear.
It is quite difficult to find one coherent view about what the
ecumenical movement actually entails or what its exact final
objective might be. Church leaders' views of ecumenism seem rather
similar to the ways different European leaders view the European
Economic Community.
Some are quite vIsIOnary, and see the
movement as a means to bring about unity in administration and
policy. Thus, just as some people envision a single, clear European
voice, some hope that a single Christian organization might result
from the culmination of the ecumenical movement. 14 Opposed to
these conceptions are those people who are reluctant to participate in
the movement at all. Though their reasons vary, these conservatives
are agreed that if any change should occur at all, it must be modest
and extremely gradual. The majority of people, hoth with regards to
the EEC and the ecumenical movement, however, seem to fall
somewhere in between these two poles.
Theirs is a rather vague
commitment to finding the best mix of unity and independence: the
fabled "golden mean". However, regardless of the degree of support,
there seems to be a theological view common to those supporting
ecumenical developments.
This VIew is grounded in a theological
method that has heen described b,y ___ ~n ecumenist from the Lutheran
tradition:
(I propose) an explanation of ecumenism by the description
of a theological method that is characterized by the following;

1. The recognition of the ambiguity of all theological statements because of the inadequacy of human language to
comprehend the transcendent.
2. The acknowledgement of the need to find new language
and concepts to express Christian belief.
3. The acceptance of a view of relative emphasis that certain
doctrines from the past may no longer be as crucial to the
essentials 01" the Christian message.
4. The approval of legitimate diversity in the interpretation
of doctrine so that the same mystery 01" faith can be differently
expressed.
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5. The willingness to hear the Gospel afresh and clarify or
modify denominational traditions in view of that gospel. 1 5

It should be fairly clear that these characteristics describe a
liberal view of scripture.
The first point elaborated is clearly nonfundamentalist; indeed, accepting that all theological statements are
ambiguous is in direct opposition to the view that the Bible is "totally
inerrant", wh ic his a pri mary characteri stic of fundamentalism.
Likewise, the second point is not of fundamentalist origin, for the
fundamentalist has no "need" for "new language" in Christianity; the
authors of the New Testament provided all the wri tings needed for
the Christian faith.
Again, the third point refuting the need to
emphasize past doctrines diametrically opposes the Christian
fundamentalist ideal of "back to the Bible"; Paisley's adherence to
Reformation concepts of the Pope as the Antichrist is a powerful
example of this from a Northern Irish context.
The fourth point
elaborated IS fairly ambiguous and thus does not directly or
powerfully present an opposItIOn to fundamentalism, although the
tendency of Christian fundamentalist denominations to see
themselves as the exclusive "elect" (to borrow a term from Calvin)
seems to deny any concept of "legitimate diversity." Pinally, the last
el aborated characteristic's "wi II i ngness to hear the Gospel afresh" is
in opposition to fundamentalism, for Christian fundamentalists
believe the texts of the Gospels to have the same meaning today as
they did when Christ's Apostles transcribed them.
Thus, if we
adhere to Schmidt's definition of a Christian liberal as elaborated in
chapter 3, pages 30-], then it is cle'l.f that the ecumenical movement

may be classed as a product of liberal Christian theology.
Recognizing this reveals the barriers to accepting ecumenism
for those with more fundamentali')t theological views.
The
ecumenical movement is based on a view of scripture that depends
upon critical analysis that does not' immediately assume it to be
directly transmitted from God to the re~der-it emphasizes that the
author must be also considered. As a result, fundamentalists, with
their literalistic interpretation of the Holy Bible's message, seem
excluded from participation in this movement almost by definition.
Ecumenism, in its more extreme forms, seeks to basically "overhaul"
Christianity by eventually doing away with denominational
distinctions altogether, or at least to reduce differences between the
denominations through compromise about contentious theological
Issues. This in turn would blur the very real, if stylistic, distinctions
represented by the names of th'e' varying chnominations.
To
fundamentalists who agree with the uncomproll}ising stubbornness

"

II,
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of their particular denomination's founder(s), who broke with the
main body of the church in days past rather than accept such
compromises on any number of issues, the ecumenical movement
represents not "socialism coming in through the back door" through
the unification of Europe feared by political leaders like Thatcher,
but rather is seen by many fundamentalists as Satan coming in
through the back door via ecumenism, for the movement is grounded
in an alternative perception of the Christian faith.
It is not that
Christian unity does not seem a worthy goal to these people, but that
unity is not worth the risk to the soul entailed by compromising on
matters of doctrine that have for many congregations been extolled
as the reason they have the "truth" and not some other group. With
these implications in mind, it should only require a brief survey of
the various Protestant churches for their posi tions on the matter of
ecumenism to be uncIerstandable.
As has been previously mentioned, the Church of Ireland has
been
more favorable
to ecumenism
than
other Protestant
denominations in the province.
This is substantially attributable to
the close relations with the Church of England, which has taken a
In the early
leacIing role in advancing the ecumenical movement.
1980s, for example, the Church of England participated in a series of
discussions with the Roman Catholic church that produced a joint
report, which the Times of London described as placing the Anglican
body on a "convergent course with the Roman Catholic church."l6
Nor should it be assumed that the Church of Ireland was dragged
reluctantly into its support of the ecumenical movement, for
Anglicanism in general has been a major moving force in ecumenism.
As one author has written:
Any history of the church in the twentieth century
makes clear the commitment of Anglicans to the ecumenical movement.
Anglican churches and their members
have played key roles in-- -international. nat ional, and
regional ecumenical efforts throughout this century.l7

This support for the ecumenical movement should not be surprising,
particularly given the fact that the liberal Christian theology which is
the basis of the ecumenical movement is shared by a considerable
number of Anglicans, as was argued in the third chapter.
Nor should it be surprising that Paisley's Free Presbyterian
church actively opposes the ecumenical movement.
His fiery
fundamentalism expressly denounces Ii beral Chri sti an theology, and
his views of the Roman Catholic church hardly lend themselves to
ecumenism. A sampling of his views should suffice to establish this
poi n t:
. . .today the leaders of the now apostate rcl"ormed(Protestant)
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churches arc tripping over one another to slabber on the
Pope's slippers. The World Council of Churches (WCC) has
become the vestibule of the Vatican. 1 8

If the ecumenical WCC is the "vestibule of the Vatican", then in
Paisley's theology it is the domain of the Antichrist. Paisley does not
confine his CTltIcIsm of the ecumenical movement to vague
denunciations.
lIe expressly condemns the Church of Ireland for its
role in expanding the movement:
For years I have been warning that the ecumenical churches
were simply going down the Roman road.
The ecumenists
have vehemently denied this.
Now the real truth is surfacing.
The Anglicans arc now prepared to acknowledge the Pope as
the Head of the Universal Church and to yield submission to
him even though the official teaching of Rome is that they
arc a bunch of imposters . . . The Church of Ireland is deeply
involved in this betrayal of our Reformation heritage because
the Joint Anglican Chairman of the Anglican-Roman Catholic
Commission is no less than Dr. McAdoo, the Church of Ireland
Archbishop of Dublin, (and) the Primate of Ireland. 19

In this quote lies much of what we have been discussing throughout
this project.
Protestant garrisonism is exhibited quite strongly: even
discussing compromise with the Roman Catholic church about
religious matters is "going down the Roman road," which implies a
complete "sell-out" to the other side-also note that any concessions
that may have been made by the Vatican were not mentioned. Also,
fundamentalist religion is a primary source of this garrisonism, and it
is directed not only at the Roman Catholic church, but at the fellow
Ulster Protestants in the Church of Ireland who do not share these
fundamentalist views to such an extent.
In this way, the Free
Presbyterian view of the ecumenical movement brings the often
elusive conflict between Presbyterian and Anglican into sharper
focus.
As was mentioned in the chapter about Ian Paisley, it is
possible to extrapolate some views of the mainstream Irish
Presbyterian churches from thoseof·the Free Presbyterian church. 20
As one author has written:
. . .Northern Ireland's mainstream Presbyterianism
differed from the fundamentalist evangelical Presbyterianism typified by Ian Paisley only in fervour and
intensity of belier.21

Though the Presbyterians are hardly as vocal as the Reverend
Paisley upon the matter of ecumenism, they have been reI uctant to
partIcIpate in the movement, particularly when compared to the
Anglicans.
For example, they withdrew from the World Council of
Churches when that ecumenical body expressed support for South
African liheration movements. 22
Despite the existence of liberal
Presbyterians who feel ecumenlsm a proper way to progress, it
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seems that the bulk of the Presbyterian laity are extremely reluctant
to join the ecumenical movement.
One observer has justified this
contention by commenting upon the organizational structure of the
churches.
Noting that in the Anglican church, the hierarchy has a
considerable amount of power regarding the direction taken by the
church, the more democratic (in the literal sense of 'government by
the people') organization of the Presbyterian church could not move
towards ecumenism without the consent of the laity, and this consent
simply does not exist within the ranks of the Presbyterian church.
Loughlin has written that:
lL is only in the last twenty years or so with the widespread
destruction and death caused hy the Troubles that the Church
leaderships have been jolted out of these 'frozen' theologies.
Contacts of an ecumenical and theological nature have been
developed, and the leaders of the main Churches have often
spoken together on various issues, while (still) retaining
their basic political orientations.
This has been easier for
the Catholics and the Anglicans . . . whose leaderships are
'freer' institutionally from their flocks.
The Presbyterians,
on the other hand, are more under the control of the
grass-roots. 23

The basic fundamentalism of the Presbyterian faith combined with
the political barriers to ecumenism make the ecumenical movement
seem to be another form of compromise with the Catholics, and thus
something which would ultimately weaken the position of Ulster
Protestants as part of the United Kingdom.
The behavior of the
Church of Ireland seems to more extreme Presbyterians a form of
religious "Lundyism", a sell-out of the entire "garrison" of Ulster
Protestants to the Roman Catholics.
It is in this light that the
ecumenical movement should be viewed in relation to Northern Irish
Protestant religion and politics.
It is a form of compromise that
highlights the various positions of the denominations within the
Protestant religious and political cO.m!TIunity.
In summation, we find that the Anglicans are arrayed closest to
ecumenical compromise.
Their overtures to the Roman Catholic
church on a religious level, the church's history of discrimination
against the Dissenters, and their long-time economic dominance
make them a likely target of Presbyterian animosity.
On the other
side of the ecumenical fence are the Presbyterians, the largest
Protestant denomination tn Northern Ireland.
They are more
garrisonistic in their behavior towards the Roman Catholic
community than the Anglicans, and thus are wary of the Church of
IreJand's motives in promoting any form of unity with the Roman
Catholic church.
This in turn causes the Presbyterians to question
the political
resolve of individual Anglicans to not yield to the
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Catholic community on the all-importan L issue of Northern Ireland's
constitutional link with Britain.
Feedillg these fears is the tall and
vocal figure of Ian Paisley, a theological leader with a massive
political following in the province.
By examining the ecumenical
movement, one can see this disposition of religious forces most
clearly, and it dramatically rerresents what I see to be the
topography of Protestant politics in Northern Ireland.
I Barkley, "Presbyterian -Roman Cathol ic Relat ions ,1750-1975", The Month, July
1981,p.226.
2Rouse,el. a1. History of the Ecumenical Movement, p. 15.
3Rusch, Ecumenism,p.59.
4Rouse,el.al. History of the EClimenical Movement,p.27; Troeltsch,Protestantism
and Progress,p.99.
5 Rusch ,E came nisln,p. 65.
6Ibid.,p.70.
7 Barkley ,"Presbyterian-RC Relations. . ." ,p.226-27.
8 It is interesting to note that each of these conferences occurred in the Irish
Republic, which is off-limits to Paisley by the Reverend's personal choice.
Barkley supports the cOlltention that the informal talks facilitated the official
ecumenical meetings, l/)id.,p.226.
9Ibid.,p.227.
10Hurley ,"Reconcili at ion in I reI and" ,The Month,July/Aug. 1984,p.300.
IlMcEvoy,"Ecumenism in Northern Ireland",p.228.
12Ibid.,p.229.
13Rusch ,E cume niSin ,p. 95.
14Rusch has written that the final stage of ecumenism would be" ... communion.
Now it no longer makes sense to think of (Christian) fellowship as consisting
of two or more separate entities.
Rather, all separation is overcome in the
appropriate wholeness and singleness of the body of Christ."Ecumenism,p.117.
15lbid., p.48-9.
16Times, October 10, 1983,p.16.
17Rusch,F Clime nism ,p. 95.
lRpaisley,No Pope lIere,p.82.
19Ibid.,p.93.
200'Collnell,"Faith and Conllict in Northern Ireland",Mont/z, Feb. 1990,p. 50.
21 McSweeney, quoted in Ibid.,p.56.
22L(Jughlin,Role of the Churches II" Month, Jan. 1990,p.17.
The similarity
between the position of the Afrikaaners in South Africa and the Protestants is
Northern I reland is one that has been noted by a number of observers [sec
Crawford, Loyal tn King Billy].
This results in almost automatic partisan
support or rejection of the cause of such groups as the ANC.
For example, at a
recent Belfast City Council meeting, a Sinn Fein councillor suggested that
Belfast officially celebrate the release of Nelson Mandela.
One councillor for
overwhelmingly Protestant East Belfast denounced this move, stating that
Nelson Mandela was "nothing but a black Provo" rslang for the Provisional
IRA].
I
2 3Loughlin,"Role of the Churches 11", Month,
Jan 1990, p.17.
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CONCLIJSJONS
Throughout the course of this study I have tried to emphasize
three major points about the political role of Ulster Protestant
religious organizations.
One is that the Ulster Protestants are a
diverse political coalition, and thus are not the monolithic group they
are so often portrayed to be.
Another is that the differences that
divide them can be observed to fall broadly along denominational
lines, primarily between the Presbyterians and the Church of
Ireland.
These differences manifest themselves theologically,
historically, and, to a lesser degree, economically and demographically.
Almost paradoxically, however, these groups also share
characteristics that unite them in OppOS1tIOn to other, more
dangerous threats, such as submersion in an overwhelmingly Catholic
Ireland, or the fear of a "sell-out" ongmating at Westminster.
Unfortunately, in many studies of the province, these very real
cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community have been either
glossed over or ignored.
They exist, and the primary aim of this
study has been to bring them to light.
Finally, these denominational differences, which seem to arise
primarily from a fundamentalist/liberal theological conflict, increase
the political and social garrisonism exhibited by the Ulster
Protestants.
Traceable to the days of the Plantation of the
seventeenth century, this tendency of the Ulster Protestant
community to assume a combative, defensive posture in times of
crisis has been modified to include such more recent "attacks" as the
Irish lIome Rule movement, which the overwhelming majority of
Ulster Protestants opposed for a variety of economic and religious
reasons, and the more direct threat posed by Irish republicanism,
most dramatically represented by the Provisional IRA.
The fact of
divisions within the Protestant _~9mmunity makes this defensive
posture appear and perhaps become unstable in the face of these
"threats" leads those on the Unionist extremes to become even more
garrisonistic in their attitudes and behavior.
The paragon of Protestant extremism in Northern Ireland is the
Reverend Ian Paisley.
By combining the tradition of Ulster
Protestant garri sonism (both reI igious and pol it ical) wi th the fervor
and vigor of A merican reI igious fundamental ism, Paisley gives a new
expression to old fears of the Protestant population of the province of
Northern Ireland, and
this expreSSIOn
heightens Protestant
garrisonism and blocks the way towards any consensual resolution of
the troubles that plague Ulster.
His Free Presbyterianism seems a
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concentration of those features in mainstream Presbyterianism that
divide it from the more liberal Church of Ireland.
The different attitudes of the churches towards the ecumenical
movement presents these differences between Protestant religious
bodies, and additionally supports the argument that their theological
differences arise from a fundamentalist/liberal split.
The Church of
Ireland is the most supportive of this movement, though political
considerations make it less progressive than its English counterpart.
Diametrically opposed to any union with the Roman Catholic church
is the Reverend Paisley, who believes the Pope to be the Antichrist.
In the middle, though still extremely reluctant to even discuss
ecumenical union with the Church of Rome, are the mainstI earn Irish
Presbyterians.
In conclusion, religion seems to play a Janus-faced role in
Ulster Protestant politics. On one hand it is a cohesive cultural factor.
Being a Northern Irish Protestant implies a shared history and
theology that binds virtually the entire Ulster Protestant population
behind an uncompromising political rhetoric and activism directed
against both Irish Republicans and British politicians.
On the other
hand, it also is a source of dissent within this community.
The
varying degrees of opposition to the Catholic church and attitudes
towards scriptural interpretation m,lke the more fundamentalist and
uncompromising within Unionist ranks fearful that the resolve of
those who would accommodate the Roman Catholic population is not
strong enough to ensure the survival of Northern Ireland as a
political entity.
Because of their heightened garrisonism, they see
any form of compromise as a form of "Lundyism," an act of betrayal
against the entire Unionist population, and oppose it to the fuIl of
their strength.
It is this intransigence of a significant proportion of
Ulster Unionists which is a major contributing factor to the enduring
nature of the "Troubles." Unfortun,Hely, the reasons for its existence
are factors that arc not readily changed or forgotten, and its
continuation seems assured.
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the curing

of concrete

curing has

become a popular method of accelerating the gain

of compressive

strength in

process minimizes
reducing the

and mass produce the members. Steam

precast concrete

plant cycle

time that

members. This

time and maximizes output by

the concrete

must

remain

in

the

forms.
A typical

plant cycle

steam curing,

includes casting,

stripping the

(Hanson, 1963).

The

forms, and

concrete is

initial set,

cleaning the forms

first placed in reusable

forms and then allowed to begin its initial set. A few hours
later, the

members are

pressure for

subjected to

a specified

develops sufficient

steam at

atmospheric

length of time. When the concrete

strength, the

forms

are

removed

and

cleaned.
A critical

factor in

the success

of the steam curing

procedure is the rate at which the temperature in the curing
chamber is

increased from

maximum temperature.
between three

room temperature

This study

practical rates

to a specified

examines the
of rise

(~OO

relationship

F/hr, 50° F/hr,

and 60° F/hr) and the compressive strengths of the concrete.

..
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2. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE

The experiment procedure consisted of fabricating the
specimens, curing the specimens, and testing the specimens.
2-..LF-2.bl;.'.iC3itioIl._ Q f Spe cim.~ns
Three batches

were cast

to test

the

three

separate

rates of rise. All batches were laboratory mixes prepared in
a 7.5 ft 3 mixer.
mix designed

The test specimens were fabricated using a

to produce

an approximate

28-day strength of

6000 psi.

Standard 6 x 12 in. molds were used in compliance

with ASTM

C470, and

described in

the specimens

ASTM C31.

The coarse

were molded

by methods

aggregate used was ASTM

Number 67, and the fine aggregate was crushed limestone. The
mix design for one c.y. is as follows:
Type I Portland Cement:

752 lb.

Coarse Aggregate:

1,730 lb.

Fine Aggregate:

1,242 lb.

Water:

z 292

1990). The

water content

varied ±1%

lb.

(Oluokum,

because the slump for

each batch was held constant at 2-3/4 inches.
~C~n&-of

Specimens

Each batch
specimens. The
the same

consisted of

six moist and six steam-cured

twelve cylinders for each batch were cast at

time and

allowed an

initial set

period of

five

hours. Next,

six of

chamber. The

temperature was increased at a particular rate

to the

the specimens were placed in the steam

maximum temperature

of 160

of in the steam chamber

(See Figure 1). Each batch of concrete remained in the steam

----------------------"-

5

chamber for

a total

of 16

hours. The three different rise

rates are demonstrated in Figure 2.
After the

total curing time had elapsed, the specimens

were removed.

At the

age of

2~

hours,

the

samples

were

stripped and placed in the moist room where curing continued
at 73°F in compliance with ASTM C192.
_2. 3

Q_f__~.E5L<;!irrlens

Te~j:.ing

Four specimens from each batch, two steam cured and two
moist cured,
the ages of

were tested for compressive strength values at
2~

the specimens
C617). The

hours, 3 days, and 28 days. Prior to testing,
were capped

tests were

with

conducted

a

sulfur
in

compound

uniaxial

(ASTM

compression

until failure. A total of 36 cylinders were tested.
3. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From the basic test data (Table 1), average values were
obtained

representing each data point (Table 2). The moist-

cure values

represent the

overall averages

of

the

moist

cured specimens.
The first

graphic data

display (Figure

3 ) shows

the

average strength values for each data point (psi) versus age
of the

concrete (days) . In this graphic, the values used to

represent the

moist cure

samples are

the averages

of all

three batches. As expected, the strengths of the moist-cured
specimens are

significantly lower than the strengths of the

steam-cured specimens
needed to
remove the

develop

at

the

early ages. Thus, steam curing is
compressive

forms promptly

strength

without damaging

required

the

to

concrete.
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However, the actual strength of the steam-cured concrete may
be shadowed

by the

early strength.

steam-cured specimens
rise have

representing the

essentially

(Figure 3).

The

the

same

three

groups

of

different rates

of

strength

at

early

ages

This property may be desirable to precast plant

operators, but the similar early strengths may actually give
the impression

that the

regardless

the

of

strengths impair

rise

three batches have equal strengths
rate.

Thus,

quality control

the

similar

because the

early

various rise

rate conditions are undetectable at early ages.
The compressive strengths of the batches at 28 days are
not as comparable as the early age strengths (Figure 3). The
~OoF

rise

and 50 0 F

rise batches

have practically the same

strength, and all are above the design strength of 6000 psi.
However, the
28 days

compressive strength

is below

the design

noticeable decrease
microcracks in

strength of

is perhaps

the concrete

of the 60°F rise rate at

caused by

6000

psi.

This

the formation of

when it is subjected to higher

rise rates in the steam chamber.
Plotting the strengths (psi) versus the rise rates with
three data

points on

one vertical

line

representing

one

batch vividly reveals the degradation of the 28-day strength
of the

60°F rise

batch (Figure

~).

The one-day and three-

day compressive

strengths of

essentially the

same. On

vividly reveals

degradation over time in the development of

ultimate strength

all steam-cured specimens are

the other

capacity. Although

hand, the 28-day curve

the moist,

~OoF

rise,

7
and 50°

rise values

considerably lower

are consistent, the 60°F rise value is
and is below the design strength of 6000

psi.
Ij..

CONCLUSIONS
The results

that high
chamber

discussed in

rise rates

may

cause

of temperature
microcracking

phenomenon noticeably
ultimate strength
rate of
below

the preceding

reduces the

in steam

in

in the
the

rate of

section ,show
steam
concrete.

curing
This

development

of

cured concrete members. For the

rise of 60 0 F/hr, the 28-day compressive strength is
the 6000 psi design strength.

Furthermore, the effect of the high rise rates does not
become evident until the concrete has aged. For many precast
members, this
avoid

this

flaw may
situation,

not be easily detected. In order to
plant

operators

must

give

more

attention to controlling the rate of temperature rise in the
steam chamber. The rise must be closely monitored to produce
precast members that possess the necessary design strength.

8
REFERENCES

Hanson, J. A.

(1963). "Optimum Steam Curing Procedure in

Pre casting Plants," J9urnal
lnst~~~t~,

.9_t

the AID.§riQ..g.n

Conpret.~

Proceedings, 60(1), 75-99.

Oluokum, F. A., Burdette, E. G., Deatherage, J. H.

(1990).

"Concrete Physical Property Development at Early Ages-The Influence of Steam Curing." Department of Civil
Engineering, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
Tennessee.
Oluokum, F. A., Burdette, E. G., Deatherage, J. H.

(1990).

"Rates of Development of Physical Properties of
Concrete at Early Ages." Department of Civil
Engineering, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
Tennessee.

TABLE 1:
BASIC TEST DATA
40 F/HR RISE
28 DAY

24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 2740 psi
2. 2600 psi

1. 4860 psi
2. 4930 psi

1. 6650 psi
2. 6930 psi

Steam

1. 5840 psi
2. 5270 psi

1. 5870 psi
2. 5570 psi

1. 6580 psi
2. 6930 psi

24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 3150 psi
2. 3060 psi

1. 4490 pSI
2. 4704 pSI

.
.

1. 6500 psi
2. 6260 psi

Steam

1. 5550 psi
2. 5290 psi

1. 5730 psi
2. 5750 psi

1. 6190 psi
2. 6680 psi

24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 3130 psi
2. 3160 psi

1. 4810 psi
2. 5000 psi

1. 6330 psi
2. 6580 psi

Steam

1. 5290 psi
2. 5590 psi

1. 5660 psi
2. 5480 pSI

1. 6010 psi
2. 5730 pSI

50 F/HR RISE
28 DAY

60 F/HR RISE
28 DAY

.

.

TABLE 2:
AVERAGE TEST DATA
40 F/HR RISE
24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 2670 psi

1. 4900 psi

1. 6790 psi

Steam

1. 5550 psi

1. 5720 psi

1. 6750 psi

24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 3100 psi

1. 4600 psi

1. 6380 psi

Steam

1. 5420 psi

1. 5740 psi

1. 6440 psi

24 HR

3 DAY

Moist

1. 3150 pSI

1. 4910 psi

1. 6450 psi

Ste.am

2. 5440

2. 5570 pSI

2 . 5870 psi

28 DAY

50 F!HR RISE
28 DAY

60 F!HR RISE

.
pSI.

28 DAY

.
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